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The Independent Board as Shield

Gregory H. Shill*
Abstract
The fiduciary duty of loyalty bars CEOs and other executives
from managing companies for personal gain. In the modern
public corporation, this restriction is reinforced by a pair of
institutions: the independent board of directors and the business
judgment rule. In isolation, each structure arguably promotes
manager fidelity to shareholder interests—but together, they
enable manager prioritization. This marks a particularly
striking turn for the independent board. Its origin story and
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raison d’être lie in protecting shareholders from opportunism by
managers, but it functions as a shield for managers instead.
Numerous defects in the design and practice of the
independent board inhibit its ability to curb managerial excess.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the context of transactions
that enrich the CEO. When executive compensation and similar
matters are approved by independent directors, they take on a
new quality: they become insulated by the business judgment
rule. This rule is commonly justified as giving legal effect to the
comparative advantage of businesspeople in their domain—in
determining the price of a product, for example—and it
immunizes such decisions from court challenge. But independent
directors can opt to extend the rule’s protection beyond this
narrow class of duty of care cases to domains that squarely
implicate the duty of loyalty. The result is a shield for conflicts
of interest that defeats the major objective of the independent
board and important goals of corporate law more generally.
This Article proposes to eliminate the independent board’s
paradoxical shield quality by ending business judgment
protection for claims implicating the duty of loyalty. Judges
would apply the familiar entire fairness standard instead. The
clearest rationale for this reform comes from the logic of the rule
itself: comparative advantage. Judges, not businesspeople, are
best situated to adjudicate conflicts of interest. More broadly, the
Article’s analysis suggests that the pro-shareholder reputation of
the independent board is overstated and may have inadvertently
fostered a sense of complacency around board power.
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Introduction

The business judgment rule places management decisions
that implicate the duty of care, such as salary levels for the
rank-and-file, all but beyond the review of courts.1 The theory
1. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as
Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 87 (2004) (“On the one hand, the
duty of care requires that directors exercise reasonable care in making
corporate decisions. On the other hand, the business judgment rule mandates
that courts defer to the board of directors’ judgment absent highly unusual
exceptions.”).
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underlying this policy is that businesspeople and the market are
better able to decide these questions. 2 In the age of independent
board governance, however, the scope of deference to board
discretion no longer tracks this logic of comparative advantage.3
Instead, decisions by management that implicate questions of
loyalty—such as whether to cut the CEO a $100 million bonus
check—can be placed beyond judicial review, too, simply by dint
of having been approved by directors who claim nominal
independence from the corporation.4 This change has allowed
CEOs and directors to shield transactions benefiting themselves
and each other from shareholders, courts, and market
discipline.5
The independent board of directors was a well-intentioned
response to the special problems of the modern public
corporation.6 In the early days of the New Deal, William O.
Douglas—then a professor at Yale Law School, later the
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission and an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court—developed a set of
proposals designed “to afford additional protection against the
evils of the last decade”7 that brought the country to the brink
of economic ruin.8 In 1934, Douglas published a theory of
corporate self-monitorship that would eventually become the
independent board.9 This invention responded to a problem
2. See id. at 117–18 (explaining the common rationale for the business
judgment rule which suggests that business experts may know business better
than judges).
3. See infra Part IV.
4. See Leo E. Strine Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role
of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 691 (2010) (discussing the
resulting duty and accountability issues created as board compositions become
increasingly independent).
5. See infra Parts IV–V.
6. See infra Part II.
7. William O. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV.
1305, 1307 (1934).
8. See EDWIN P. HOYT, WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS: A BIOGRAPHY 40–41, 48, 69
(1979) (detailing Douglas’ employment at Yale, the SEC, and as an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court).
9. See Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Status Bound: The Twentieth Century
Evolution of Directors’ Liability, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 63, 103–05 (2009)
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identified by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means two years earlier:
shareholders in the modern corporation, who were remote from
corporate operations and beset by collective action problems,
struggled to effectively monitor managers.10
This situation left public companies effectively captive to
the CEO and other insiders, 11 who could, in countless lawful
ways, benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders.12 The
proposed change gathered strength over the decades, gained
crucial intellectual support in the 1970s,13 and became
increasingly common in the late twentieth century.14 In 1993,
Stephen Bainbridge observed that “virtually all subsequent
corporate law scholarship has focused on the extent to which
corporate law ought to prevent management” from abusing its
control of the corporation.15 Early in the new millennium, U.S.
stock exchanges codified what had become market practice by
(discussing Douglas’ 1934 article, Directors Who Do Not Direct, and its
influence on the evolution of corporate boards).
10. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 6 (1932) [hereinafter BERLE & MEANS,
THE MODERN CORPORATION] (“The separation of ownership from control
produces a condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate manager
may, and often do, diverge, and where many of the checks which formerly
operated to limit the use of power disappear.”). N.B. Berle was a onetime
faculty colleague of Douglas’. See Jessica Wang, Neo-Brandeisianism and the
New Deal: Adolf A. Berle, Jr., William O. Douglas, and the Problem of
Corporate Finance in the 1930s, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1221, 1223 (2010)
(discussing Berle’s and Douglas’ tenure at Columbia University).
11. Except where noted, this Article will use the terms managers,
insiders, and executives interchangeably. All refer to top officers who are
responsible for management of the corporation.
12. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALI
Corporate Governance Project, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1034, 1034 (1993)
(“Because no single shareholder owns enough stock to affect corporate
decisionmaking, the firm is effectively controlled by its managers. Unchecked,
management may abuse its control by benefiting itself at the expense of the
shareholder-owners.”).
13. See, e.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE
CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 162–70 (1976) (promoting a monitoring
conception of the board).
14. See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in
the United States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices,
59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007).
15. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1034.
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requiring listed companies16 to appoint boards consisting of a
majority of independent directors.17
Debates over the independent board have become proxy
fights over a central question in corporate law: whether
corporate power should favor shareholders or managers.18 Some
commentators favor giving managers a wide berth and leaving
discipline to the market,19 while others see an independent
16. The terms “listed companies” and “public companies” will be used
interchangeably to refer to companies that are subject to listing requirements
imposed by stock exchanges. While the term “public companies” technically
also includes companies whose stock is traded over the counter rather than on
an exchange, these companies are generally much smaller and are not subject
to stock exchange rules, and thus no such meaning is intended in this Article.
See, e.g., Public Company, NASDAQ, https://perma.cc/U6TT-B64M (defining a
public company as “[a] company that has held an initial public offering and
whose shares are traded on a stock exchange or in the over-the-counter
market”).
17. The independent board mandate went into effect in 2003. See Listed
Company Manual, § 303A.01 Independent Directors, N.Y. STOCK EXCH.,
https://perma.cc/PT36-E4VR (setting forth a requirement that New York
Stock Exchange-listed companies have boards composed of a majority of
independent directors); Rulebook—The Nasdaq Stock Market, NASDAQ, https://
perma.cc/7LAW-RXUT [hereinafter Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules] (“A majority of
the board of directors must be comprised of Independent Directors.”). Some
exceptions exist, discussed at Part II.B, infra.
18. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A
Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 474 (2014); see also Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1034
(observing that “[v]irtually all” corporate law scholarship since Berle and
Means “has focused on the extent to which corporate law ought to prevent
management from” abusing its control).
19. For expressions of this view generally, see, for example, Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance,
97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 551 (2003) (discussing the role of the market in
disciplining boards); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case
Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 659–60 (2010)
(observing that the role of the manager is better suited than that of the
shareholder to maximize the value of the corporation); Martin Lipton &
William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 733, 734
(2007) (arguing that a director-centered approach maximizes value and
benefits the economy); Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1069 (commenting on the
conflict managers in buyout transactions face between maximizing firm rather
than individual wealth); see also Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About
Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 564 (2006) (taking issue
with “the characterization of shareholders as having interests that are
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board elected by shareholders as a key internal counterweight
to managers.20 But this difference in philosophy, while
conspicuous, masks a deeper consensus: neither perspective
acknowledges—much less endeavors to address—the shield
problem.21
The supposedly “dueling ideological mythologists” who
represent the two schools take as their point of departure, as
Douglas did, that the independence model in fact operates as a

fundamentally in harmony with one another”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal
at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 773
(2006) (proposing that the U.S. corporate law structure creates significant
accountability issues through director primacy). A different view that likewise
de-emphasizes shareholder power and would prioritize instead a wider swath
of stakeholder interests, including not only managers, directors, and
shareholders, but also employees, communities, creditors, and other outsiders
to the corporate structure, can be found in the work of Margaret Blair and
the late Lynn Stout. See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH:
HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE
PUBLIC 105–06 (2012) (maintaining that the popular aim of only maximizing
shareholder value is misplaced and is detrimental to the economy); Lynn A.
Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789,
808–09 (2007) (discussing the potential danger to stakeholders that could
result from ceding power from managers to shareholders); Margaret M. Blair
& Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV.
247, 315–16 (1999) (“[When] directors are limited in their ability to use their
positions to benefit themselves, they may instead choose to use their positions
to benefit others by promoting the joint welfare of all the stakeholders who
together comprise the corporation.”).
20. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder
Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 851 (2005) (“[S]hareholders should have the
power, subject to certain procedural requirements, to initiate and adopt
rules-of-the-game decisions to amend the charter or to reincorporate in
another state.”); Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law’s Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233,
242–43 (2002); Ronald L. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (and What We
Can Do About It), 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 507 (2001); Melvin A. Eisenberg,
The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1479–80 (1989);
EISENBERG, supra note 13, at 172–73. For a discussion of the role of “voice” in
the governance of organizations, see ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND
LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 30–43
(1970).
21. See infra Parts IV–V.
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check on managers.22 In some ways, it does. 23 But the
independent board also magnifies the power of managers, the
very group whose behavior it was created to constrain.24 The
emphasis on shareholder interests has yielded an unduly
narrow understanding of independence.25 Much like the fable of
the blind men and the elephant, each of whom touch a separate
part of the animal’s body and describe its appearance
differently, “touching” the interests of management adds
important new information to the understanding of the board.26
When combined with the business judgment rule, the
benefits the independent board offers to managers are
extraordinary.27 Independent director approvals confer business
judgment immunity, which exempts directors and officers from
liability for business decisions so long as certain low-cost
procedures are followed.28 The joint product of the independent
board and the business judgment rule accomplishes a melding
of the independence quality of the former with the insulation
effects of the latter, producing a fortified shield.29 This casts
decisions around conflicts of interest as essentially questions for
the market rather than legal regulation, which is difficult to
square with principles of corporate and fiduciary law.30
The supercharged nature of the business judgment rule in
the independence era is underappreciated, even by critics of the
rule. Mark Roe, for example, has described the business
judgment rule as ensuring “realistically, no liability at all for

22. Strine, supra note 18, at 474. Strine served as Chief Justice of the
Delaware Supreme Court from 2014–2019. Delaware Chief Justice Leo E.
Strine, Jr. to Retire from Delaware Supreme Court, GOV’T OF DEL. (July 8,
2019), https://perma.cc/FM64-29H3.
23. See infra Part II.
24. See Bainbridge, supra note 19, at 559 (“[T]he vast majority of
corporate decisions are made by the board of directors alone, or by managers
acting under delegated authority from the board of directors.”).
25. See infra Parts II–V.
26. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.
27. See infra Part IV.B–C.
28. See infra Part IV.
29. See infra Part IV.
30. See generally Andrew Tuch, Reassessing Self-Dealing: Between No
Conflict and Fairness, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 939 (2019).
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mistakes, absent fraud or conflict of interest.”31 While this
protection is “nearly insurmountable,” Roe notes, boards
disqualify themselves from receiving it if they engage in “fraud
or conflict of interest.”32 While correct as a statement of black
letter law, this statement does not capture the ease with which
conflicts can be cleansed in the era of the independent board.33
Creative and well-advised boards can sidestep this limitation
and shield their conflicts through a single additional step: by
securing the approval of a majority-independent board or
committee.34 Recent data suggests they do in fact take this step
regularly with regard to self-dealing transactions, for reasons
relating to federal securities laws as well as state law.35
Notwithstanding their titular role, “independent” directors
are often loath or unable to contradict management due to
widely acknowledged structural limitations or behavioral
biases.36 Accordingly, managers have little to fear in seeking the
blessing of independent directors and much to gain.37 In
particular, managers can enlarge the universe of decisions
eligible for business judgment rule immunity.38
Upon approval of the relevant assemblage of independent
directors, attacks on the way managers and boards handle
self-interested transactions of paramount concern to them are
rendered practically inert as a matter of law.39 These decisions
are in areas such as executive compensation, takeover bids
(which threaten to result in the ouster of incumbent managers
and directors), and shareholder lawsuits against managers and
directors in their personal capacities. The relative ease of
31. Roe, supra note 20, at 242 (citations omitted).
32. Id. at 243 (emphasis added).
33. See infra Part IV.
34. See Tuch, supra note 30, at 943.
35. See id. at 973–74 (sampling and analyzing public company
disclosures).
36. These limitations include the decision to appoint a given independent
director; determination of her compensation; the decision to reappoint her; and
subtler forms of influence, such as recommending her for appointment to other
boards. See infra Part III.
37. See infra Part III.
38. See infra Part IV.B.
39. See infra Part IV.
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securing independent approval in effect provides managers with
a vehicle to leverage corporate assets for their highest personal
priorities
without
effective
oversight.40
There
are
counterexamples, of course. Delaware courts have imposed
increasingly complex requirements on management buyouts
(MBOs), for instance.41 Yet these challenges can be neutralized
with additional process, the keys to which are held by managers
(or in the case of MBOs, controlling shareholders).42
The shield quality of the independent board destabilizes the
assumptions behind shareholder and director primacy alike. In
important ways, the independent board continues to serve its
advertised purpose of empowering shareholders.43 But given its
interaction with the business judgment rule, its presumed
function as a one-way ratchet that only favors shareholders
warrants reconsideration. Given how much corporate law turns
on the assumption of a unidirectional independent board, cracks
in that assumption have potentially destabilizing implications
purely as a legal matter. But the independent board and its
shield function are not merely legal devices; they are market
mechanisms with a reach that extends across the public capital
markets.44
The independence model and the shield it enables
empowers managers beyond the realm of law.45 Most
importantly, it enhances the ability of managers and boards to
evade market discipline and capture rents from inefficiencies in
market structure and the independent board itself.46 Even
sophisticated investors like mutual funds and hedge fund
activists cannot effectively monitor the governance of the many

40. See infra Part IV.
41. See, e.g., infra Part IV.C.4; John P. Stigi II & John M. Landry,
Delaware Chancery Court Rejects Management Buyout Merger Price as Best
Evidence of Fair Value in Appraisal Proceeding, NAT’L L. REV. (June 9, 2016),
https://perma.cc/SV29-F24C (describing the heightened standard of review
adopted by a Delaware court in an MBO).
42. See infra Part IV.
43. See infra Part II.
44. See infra Parts IV–V.
45. See infra Part V.
46. See infra Part V.
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thousands of publicly traded U.S. companies.47 Proxy advisors,
whose business is to advise investors on corporate governance,
operate under scarce resources and intensifying regulatory
pressure.48 Because “independentness” is universally theorized
as a shareholder-friendly quality, enhancing the independent
character of a board is a way for managers to inexpensively
signal their fidelity to that norm and thus reduce pressure from
proxy advisors, mutual funds, and activist shareholders in the
ongoing negotiation of corporate governance.49
This Article proceeds in six additional parts. Part II
overviews the foundation of the independent board and its legal
commands. Part III presents limitations on the efficacy of
independent directors, and contends that in combination they
allow managers to take advantage of the structure’s power to
immunize self-interested decisions. Part IV highlights the
crucial domains where the independent board, in concert with
the business judgment rule, furnishes a shield-like immunity to
managerial conduct. Part V contends that the shield effect is
even more consequential than a purely legal analysis would
suggest, because it exploits the limitations of market
participants, such as institutional investors, that are believed to
serve a monitoring function. Part VI develops normative
conclusions and proposals respecting the foregoing. Chief among
these is that courts should not deem self-interested transactions
to be cleansed by the approval of independents. They should
instead be reviewed under a standard with a long history in
corporate law, the entire fairness standard.50 This would
47. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory
Competition, Regulatory Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L.
REV. 1861, 1865 (1995) (stating that managers can take advantage of the
dispersed ownership structure of the corporation to take action without owner
monitoring).
48. See Katanga Johnson & Jessica DiNapoli, U.S. SEC Proposes Rules
that Could Limit Shareholder Voices, REUTERS (Nov. 5, 2019, 10:10 AM),
https://perma.cc/F87C-WATN (describing new SEC rules that could shift
corporate power towards management).
49. See infra Parts III–IV.
50. See generally Iman Anabtawi, The Twilight of Enhanced Scrutiny in
Delaware M&A Jurisprudence, 43 DEL. J. CORP. L. 161 (2019) (describing the
entire fairness standard in Delaware law as review “for objective fairness of
both price and process”).
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constitute a partial rejection of internal self-regulation as a
substitute for external regulation, and as such has implications
for that common practice in corporate and securities law
doctrine and institutions more broadly. In Part VII, the Article
concludes.
II.

The Constitution of the Independent Board

In the early part of the twentieth century, changes in
technology and communication helped drive a great dispersion
in the ownership of public company equities.51 Coordination
problems emerged among the numerous shareholders of the
Berle and Means corporation.52 This yielded a form of
managerial governance53 that was relatively insensitive to
shareholder preferences. Thus, managers could pursue projects
that enhanced their reputations or otherwise served their
personal goals at the expense of the enterprise without fear of
consequence from shareholders. In the new ownership54

51. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 4–5 (3d ed. 2015).
52. See BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION, supra note 10, at
47–68 (documenting the increasingly dispersed ownership of contemporary
public corporations). These problems predated the arrival of the independent
board, but continued afterwards. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon,
Board 3.0: An Introduction, 74 BUS. LAW. 351, 354–55 (2019); Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 331 (1976)
(discussing issues arising from diffuse and detached shareholder ownership).
53. See EISENBERG, supra note 13, at 139–41 (contending that the typical
board was passive and its functions manager-dominated).
54. Some critics question whether shareholders truly “own” the
corporation. See, e.g., Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests
in the Company’s Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67,
94 (2003) (“[T]he shareholder as owner, principal-agent model is a flawed
model as applied to the modern public company.”); Blair & Stout, supra note
19, at 260–61 (“If ‘control’ is the economically important feature of ‘ownership,’
then to build a theory of corporations on the premise that ownership (and,
hence, control) lies with shareholders grossly mischaracterizes the legal
realities of most public corporations.”); Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1052
n.104 (contending that the corporation is a nexus of contracts rather than an
entity that is owned by shareholders). This Article does not take up this
distinction, which does not bear on its analysis. To the extent independent
boards shield managers inappropriately, they are counterproductive from a
stakeholder perspective as well as an ownership one.
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pattern, where shareholders stood little chance of influencing
managerial performance,55 shareholders were said to exhibit
“rational apathy” towards governance.56 The resulting power
vacuum left managers more dominant and potentially less
accountable to shareholders, who were the principals of the
corporation in which managers served as agents.57 Efforts to
address this form of agency costs—the gap between shareholder
and manager interests—have dominated corporate governance
scholarship for the better part of a century.58
Control of the corporation is delegated by statute to a
central board of directors, to which the corporation’s managerial
leadership is formally subordinate.59 In Berle and Means’ time,
this operated as a distinction without a difference; boards were
run by top managers.60 Beginning in the 1970s, academics and
the market began coalescing around a solution that borrowed
from Douglas’ proposal during the New Deal: directors who were
independent of managers and elected by—and thus accountable
to—shareholders would be better able to supervise managers.61
In the original model, it was virtually impossible for dispersed
shareholders to influence the outcome of corporate elections,
thus leaving the shareholder “‘practically reduced to the
alternative of not voting at all or else of handing over his vote’
to the proxy committee, appointed by existing management,

55. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 52, at 354 (listing defining features
of the “Board 2.0” model).
56. Id.
57. Principal-agent is the dominant but not unanimous framework for
understanding the shareholder-manager relationship. But see Blair & Stout,
supra note 19, at 315–16 (advancing a theory that disputes the sufficiency of
agency as an analogy). Disputes over the meaning of “ownership” in the firm
are beyond the scope of this Article.
58. See supra Part I; infra Part II.A.
59. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 141 (2020) (providing for management by
a board of directors, except under certain circumstances); MODEL BUS. CORP.
ACT § 8.01 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
60. See generally BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION, supra note
10, at 220–46 (discussing the legal position of management and of control).
61. See Mitchell, supra note 9, at 103–07 (describing Douglas’ impact on
the evolution of the independent board).

Shill.ICErecon (Do Not Delete)

1824

1/15/2021 5:06 PM

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1811 (2020)

who can ‘virtually dictate their own successors.’”62 The new
model, which Ronald Gilson and Jeffrey Gordon call “Board 2.0,”
promised to empower and engage shareholders by enabling
them to directly elect directors to the board who would take
their authority over managers more seriously.63 It was regarded
as a “necessary complement to widely distributed ownership.”64
This shift,65 which did not fully accomplish its goals,
nevertheless marked an evolution in the function of the board
from the Board 1.0 advisory body to the board as supervisor.66
A.

Background and Theory of the Independent Board

To understand the perversity of the independent board
shielding what amounts essentially to executive self-dealing (a
category this Article defines somewhat more expansively than
the literature currently does),67 it is instructive to examine
briefly the aspirations and theory of the independent model.68
Douglas endorsed the Berle and Means analysis and advocated

62. Lucian Bebchuk et al., The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors,
31 J. ECON. PERSPS. 89, 91 (2017) (quoting BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION, supra note 10, at 87).
63. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 52, at 354.
64. Id.
65. See Gordon, supra note 14, at 1472–73 (“One of the most important
empirical developments in U.S. corporate governance over the past half
century has been the shift in board composition away from insiders (and
affiliated directors) toward independent directors.”).
66. See, e.g., Gilson & Gordon, supra note 52, at 351–56 (“By the end of
the period, most large public companies had an audit committee, a
compensation committee, and some version of a nominating-governance
committee that addressed the performance of the board itself.”). Stephen
Bainbridge and Todd Henderson have suggested outsourcing various
functions as a solution to a lack of board skill or subject matter expertise in
areas of need. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE & M. TODD HENDERSON,
OUTSOURCING THE BOARD: HOW BOARD SERVICE PROVIDERS CAN IMPROVE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 90–91 (2018) (introducing the concept of the
specialty board services provider).
67. See infra Part IV.
68. Space limitations preclude a full recounting of the independent
board’s history and the reasons for its rise here. One treatment can be found
in Gordon, supra note 14, at 1472–76 (documenting the shift in board
composition in the latter half of the twentieth century).
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a solution that would later become the independent board.69
Directors, he wrote, lacked the authority to perform a
supervisory role effectively.70 To change this, he believed they
“should have a position of dominance and power on the board
rather than the subordinate position . . . [including] real power
over the executive management,” with the goal of “taking the
control or dominance of the board away from the executive
management.”71 Although it would take decades to become
orthodoxy, this solution was offered almost immediately
following the Berle and Means diagnosis.72
The independent board model gathered steam beginning in
the middle of the twentieth century,73 particularly in the
1970s.74 By 2005, “the composition of large public company
boards dramatically shifted towards independent directors,”
from roughly 20 percent independents in 1950 to 75 percent.75
At the committee level, certain committees began to be

69. See Douglas, supra note 7, at 1305–07 (advancing proposals to reform
corporate governance, drawing in part on the work of Berle and Means).
70. See id. at 1313–14 (describing some shortcomings of insider directors,
including that “boards wholly or dominantly filled with ‘shirtsleeve’ directors
drawn from the executive management, without outside representation, are
apt to suffer from myopia and lack of perspective.”).
71. Id. at 1314 (emphasis added).
72. It was less than two years after the Berle and Means book was
published that Douglas endorsed its analysis and advocated a solution that
would later become the independent board. See id. at 1314 (proposing that
taking control of the board by executive management would resolve some
problems of power); HOYT, supra note 8, at 40–41, 69 (discussing Douglas’
position as a Yale professor and his appointment to the Supreme Court).
Before Douglas moved to Yale, he and Berle were colleagues at Columbia. See
Wang, supra note 10, at 1223.
73. See Gordon, supra note 14, at 1510–15 (tracing the rise of the
corporate board model).
74. Leading intellectual contributions in this era include EISENBERG,
supra note 13 and Jensen & Meckling, supra note 52.
75. Gordon, supra note 14, at 1465. For example, “the number of
manufacturing companies having a majority of nonemployee directors
increased from 63% in 1966, to 71% in 1972, to 86% in 1989,” though not all
nonemployee directors meet requirements of independence. Bainbridge, supra
note 12, at 1066–67 n.161 (citing THE CONFERENCE BOARD, MEMBERSHIP AND
ORGANIZATION OF CORPORATE BOARDS 8 (1990)).
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constituted exclusively of independent directors.76 Later, the
audit,77 compensation,78 and nominating and governance
committees79 were required to be so constituted, and a majority
of the directors of the board as a whole were required to be
independent.80 Such directors are not employees of the
corporation and lack certain other connections to it. This rule
was instituted following high-profile accounting scandals at
Enron, WorldCom, and Arthur Andersen in the early 2000s, and
became effective in 2003.81

76. See Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules, supra note 17, § 5605(e)(1)(B) (stating
the requirement that nominating committees be fully independent).
77. See infra Part II.B; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204,
§ 302, 116 Stat. 745, 778 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241).
78. See infra Part II.B; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 952, 24 Stat. 1367, 1900 (2010) (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 78j-3).
79. See infra Part II.B; Listed Company Manual, § 303A.04(a)
Nominating/Corporate Governance Committee, N.Y. STOCK EXCH., https://
perma.cc/LV4W-K7XQ (requiring that nominating and corporate governance
committees be composed exclusively of independent directors); Nasdaq Stock
Mkt. Rules, supra note 17, § 5605(e) (same).
80. See infra Part II.B; Listed Company Manual, § 303A.01 Independent
Directors, supra note 17 (requiring that boards consist of a majority of
independent directors); Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules, supra note 17, § 5605(b)(1)
(same). The requirement of a majority-independent board applies to publicly
traded companies in the United States, with a significant exception: controlled
companies, which are defined in this context as entities in which more than
50 percent of the voting power is held by an individual, a group, or another
company. See Listed Company Manual, § 303A.00 Introduction, N.Y. STOCK
EXCH., https://perma.cc/AWE3-972G (describing the applicability of the rules);
Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules, supra note 17, § 5615(c) (noting the exemptions for
controlled companies). There are somewhat different definitions of controlled
companies in other sources for other purposes, for example Delaware law, but
however defined they account for a growing share of public companies and
market value. See IRRC INSTITUTE, CONTROLLED COMPANIES IN THE STANDARD
AND POOR’S 1500: A FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF PERFORMANCE AND RISK 23 (2016),
https://perma.cc/MAJ7-7A66 (PDF) (concluding that “the number of controlled
companies in the S&P 1500 index increased by 16.7 percent between 2005 and
2015” using an ISS controlled company definition).
81. See Listed Company Manual, § 303A.01 Independent Directors, supra
note 17; Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules, supra note 17, § 5605(b)(1).
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Initially proposed by prominent New Dealers as a
complement to a never-realized federal incorporation statute,82
the independent board ultimately gained traction as a form of
self-regulation that substituted for deeper external oversight,
both judicial and regulatory.83 The structural implications of
this shift have not gone unnoticed.84 Lisa Fairfax argues
persuasively that in cases of potential conflicts of interest,
“reliance on independent directors has been inappropriately
used to substitute for rigorous external regulation.”85 Urska
Velikonja calls them “a poor substitute for public-regarding
regulation of negative externalities,” and notes that they have
“pass[ed] as a substitute” nonetheless because they constitute a
palatable political compromise.86
The promise of an independent board has been that it could
stand in for shareholders, mitigating the agency costs intrinsic
in separating ownership from control87 by monitoring
managers.88 It is now the terrain on which great battles of
corporate governance are fought, including over executive
compensation levels, activist shareholder campaigns, proxy

82. Berle had drafted a federal incorporation bill, but it was never
enacted. See Robert B. Thompson, Adolf Berle During the New Deal: The Brain
Truster as an Intellectual Jobber, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 663, 671 (2019)
(describing Berle’s interest in, and efforts towards, implementing a federal
incorporation bill).
83. Previous commentators have emphasized the inadequacy of
independence as a substitute for regulation to achieve public ends. See, e.g.,
Urska Velikonja, The Political Economy of Board Independence, 92 N.C. L.
REV. 855, 894 (2014); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director,
96 IOWA L. REV. 127, 131 (2010) (“[T]he installation of independent directors
serves as a substitute for external regulation, particularly with respect to ‘high
risk’ transactions.”).
84. See, e.g., Velikonja, supra note 83, at 894.
85. Fairfax, supra note 83, at 193.
86. See Velikonja, supra note 83, at 894 (contending that the
independence mandate should be abolished).
87. This theory was further developed in Jensen & Meckling, supra note
52. Though Berle and Means did not use the term agency costs, they are
credited with framing the debate over problems stemming from the separation
of ownership and control.
88. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Independent Director Model
Broken?, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 775, 791 (2014) (describing the potential of the
independent board to monitor insider behavior).
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fights, and contests for control.89 It formally intermediates not
only the relationship of managers and investors (including
activist and institutional investors) to the firm, but the position
of outsiders, e.g., creditors and potential acquirers.90
Yet even for the subset of corporate decisions over which
boards have say, CEOs and other top managers exercise
powerful influence over their boards and can often secure
approval for dubious priorities. Such moves may be excessively
aggressive, but CEOs may also be excessively reticent to pursue
needed changes relative to shareholder preferences.91 Either
way, core attributes of the independent board bias it towards
enabling rather than checking manager preferences. The
independent board thus compounds the agency costs problem at
the very level (the board) where it was meant to address it; 92 it
also adds a new one, at the level of the market.93
B.

The Law of the Independent Board

The independent board structure vests in a board
something virtually unique among regulated entities: the
authority to exempt its members from judicial, regulatory, and
shareholder scrutiny in its principal spheres of action94 —and
especially the ones most likely to pose conflicts of interest for
CEOs and other insiders. Approval of a business decision by a
majority of independent directors activates this exemption by
triggering the business judgment rule. The details of the
independent board are thus critical.
The legal regulation and definition of the independent
corporate board resides in three sources: state law, federal
89. Companies that have a controlling shareholder are an exception. See
infra Parts II–III.
90. See Karmel, supra note 88, at 791 (“[T]he independent director no
longer seems to be acting on behalf of the shareholders as a check on
management, but rather, is acting to insure the quality of the corporation’s
product ratings.”).
91. See Michal Barzuza & Eric Talley, Long-Term Bias, 2020 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 104, 122 (discussing versions of this risk).
92. See infra Parts III–IV.
93. See infra Part V.
94. Of course, many provisions of law, such as workplace and
environmental regulation, are unaffected by board action.
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securities law, and stock exchanges’ regulations. An overview of
the legal standards underlying independence helps reveal the
gap between the aspiration and operation of the independent
board.
1.

State Law

State law is a leading source of law regulating the
independent board, and Delaware and its corporate law statute,
the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), are
preeminent among sources of state law.95 Delaware law does not
require that companies adopt an independent board model.96
However, it encourages independent boards through the
creation of de facto safe harbors for decisions rendered by
independent boards or committees. 97 It further regulates the
content of independence by making business judgment
deference conditional on the satisfaction of certain criteria.98
95. For a variety of reasons, most large public companies are
incorporated in Delaware. See About the Division of Corporations, DEL. DIV.
CORPS., https://perma.cc/PZ2M-A3KH (stating that “[m]ore than 66% of the
Fortune 500” are incorporated in Delaware); Brian J. Broughman & Darian
M. Ibrahim, Delaware’s Familiarity, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 273, 289–90 (2015)
(citing the DGCL’s “merits and predictability” and Delaware’s “substantial
case law, the flexibility of that law, and the expertise of the Delaware
Chancery Court and Delaware Supreme Court to hand down new decisions”
as reasons corporations choose Delaware). Because of the internal affairs
doctrine, this also means that a large share of shareholder litigation arises
under Delaware law in the Delaware Court of Chancery, which is an expert in
such matters. See VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871
A.2d 1108, 1112 (Del. 2005) (characterizing the internal affairs doctrine as “a
long-standing choice of law principle which recognizes that only one state
should have the authority to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs—the
state of incorporation”).
96. See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 141 (2020) (stating requirements for corporate
boards under Delaware law); About the Division of Corporations, supra note
95 (“The Delaware General Corporation Law is the most advanced and flexible
business formation statute in the nation.”).
97. See Broughman & Ibrahim, supra note 95, at 281 (“[W]idespread
investor and lawyer familiarity with Delaware law has an independent effect
on choice of domicile apart from any network benefits associated with
Delaware incorporation.”).
98. See id. at 288 (incorporating in Delaware would allow corporations
access to more case law, better legal services, and advantages of drafting
efficiencies from past use of Delaware law).
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Delaware law authorizes the board to immunize interested
and executive directors from conflict transactions via a
cleansing vote of an appropriate faction of disinterested,
independent directors.99 Depending on circumstances, the
approval necessary might be by a majority of all independents,
a majority of the full board (when the board is itself
majority-independent), or a committee constituted only of
independent directors.100 Crucially, directors deemed
independent by the board enjoy a presumption of independence
unless there exist “such facts as would demonstrate that
through personal or other relationships the directors are
beholden to [a] controlling person.”101
The independence inquiry is meant to ensure that “a
director’s decision is based on the corporate merits of the subject
before the board rather than extraneous considerations or
influences.”102 Boards may debate policy amongst themselves,
seek outside advice, and outsource some functions,103 but “the
end result, nonetheless, must be that each director has brought
99. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (2020); see infra Part IV.C.5 (noting a
larger discussion in the literature on the effect of a § 144 approval).
100. See infra Part IV; see also In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496,
501 (Del. Ch. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d
635 (Del. 2014) (“[T]he procedural protections employed [must] qualify to be
given cleansing credit under the business judgment rule. For example, if the
[corporation’s] special committee was not comprised of directors who qualify
as independent under our law, the defendants would not be entitled to
summary judgment under their own argument.”); Da Lin, Beyond Beholden,
44 J. CORP. L. 515, 552 (2019) (noting Delaware courts use intermediate
standards of review for specific, recurring, and readily identifiable situations
that can subtly undermine the decisions of independent and disinterested
directors).
101. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 1984), overruled on other
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (discussing
independence in the context of a derivative suit demand). A more recent
formulation explains beholdenness in the following way: an independent
director must not be “sufficiently loyal to, beholden to, or otherwise influenced
by an interested party to undermine the director’s ability to judge the matter
on its merits.” Frederick Hsu Living Tr. v. ODN Holding, No. 12108–VCL,
2017 WL 1437308, at *26 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2017).
102. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 816.
103. See BAINBRIDGE & HENDERSON, supra note 66, at 5 (“Outsourcing
happens when other business entities can do the work at lower total cost for a
given quality.”).
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his or her own informed business judgment to bear with
specificity upon the corporate merits of the issues without
regard for or succumbing to influences which convert an
otherwise valid business decision into a faithless act.”104 At the
pleading stage, it is enough for a plaintiff to marshal
particularized facts that support “an inference that [a director]
‘would be more willing to risk . . . her reputation than risk the
relationship with the interested person.’” 105
Delaware law’s regulation of director independence
eschews bright-line rules in favor of contextual inquiry. This
approach is meant to account for the behavioral dynamics of
board politics and professional networks. While a Vice
Chancellor on the Delaware Court of Chancery, Leo Strine
expanded on this duality:
[C]orporate directors are generally the sort of people deeply
enmeshed in social institutions. Such institutions have
norms, expectations that, explicitly and implicitly, influence
and channel the behavior of those who participate in their
operation. Some things are “just not done,” or only at a cost,
which might not be so severe as a loss of position, but may
involve a loss of standing in the institution . . . [C]orporate
directors are [not], as a general matter, persons of unusual
social bravery, who operate heedless to the inhibitions that
social norms generate for ordinary folk.106

The decision made clear that the relevant inquiry is not a
narrow one of whether a director feels the tug of favoritism
towards the executive in question.107 Rather, the question is
104. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 816 (emphasis added).
105. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., No. 2017-0337-SG, 2018 WL
1381331, at *15 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 2018) (quoting Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d
1040, 1052 (Del. 2004)).
106. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938 (Del. Ch. 2003).
This case is unrelated to the Oracle decision from 2018.
107. See id. at 943
I do not infer that Grundfest would be less likely to recommend suit
against Boskin than someone without [close] ties. Human nature
being what it is, it is entirely possible that Grundfest would in fact
be tougher on Boskin than he would on someone with whom he did
not have such connections.
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whether personal ties and other affiliations were of such a
character—i.e., close enough—that it was hard for the director
to assess conduct neutrally, “without pondering his own
association with [the executive] and their mutual affiliations.”108
Put another way, a court will deny a director independent status
where a plaintiff pleads facts showing that “the director in
question’s material ties to the person whose proposal or actions
she is evaluating are sufficiently substantial that she cannot
objectively fulfill her fiduciary duties.” 109
In recent years, Delaware courts have made clear that the
nature of a disqualifying connection need not be financial or
familial and can be more generically personal. While the
Delaware Supreme Court stated in a decision regarding Martha
Stewart’s company in 2004 that “[a]llegations of mere personal
friendship or a mere outside business relationship, standing
alone, are insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about a
director’s independence,”110 language in more recent decisions
clarifies that the burden on plaintiffs is more permissive. In the
MFW111 case, for example, the Chancery Court (per
then-Chancellor Strine) observed:
[I]t is sometimes blithely written that “mere allegations of
personal friendship” do not cut it. More properly, this
statement would read “mere allegations of mere friendship”
do not qualify. If the friendship was one where the parties
had served as each other’s maids of honor, had been each
other’s college roommates, shared a beach house with their
families each summer for a decade, and are as thick as blood
relations, that context would be different from parties who
occasionally had dinner over the years, go to some of the

108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d at 509.
110. Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1052 (Del. 2004) (emphasis added);
see Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216 (Del. 1996) (describing lack of
independence in the demand futility context as the presence of “a material
financial or familial interest”).
111. 67 A.3d 496 (Del. Ch. 2013).
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same parties and gatherings annually, and call themselves
“friends.”112

Undoubtedly the clear-in-principle, porous-in-fact distinction
the court drew between friends (acceptable) and close friends
(questionable) was intended to account for the reality,
acknowledged by Strine a decade earlier in Oracle,113 that
outside directors occupy the same small circles as the executives
they are supposedly monitoring.114 Relationships within those
circles “can give rise to human motivations compromising the
participants’ ability to act impartially toward each other on a
matter of material importance,”115 but courts of Delaware (and
other states) have nevertheless been reluctant to intervene.116
Delaware
decisions
regarding
independence
are
characterized by a lack of consistency.117 This is in part a
consequence of the context-constrained nature of the inquiry
under Delaware law. In litigation—unlike for listing
purposes—the measure of independence is not taken in the
abstract, but in relation to a specific board decision or
transaction. It can enable or frustrate the application of the
112. Id. at 509 n.37 (emphasis added). This case is discussed in greater
detail in infra Part IV. N.B. Chancellor Strine went on to serve as Chief Justice
of Delaware, from 2014–2019.
113. 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003).
114. This approach echoes that of earlier decisions by Delaware courts,
which acknowledge the possibility of excessively close personal ties in
principle but shy away from policing such connections. See, e.g., Zapata Corp.
v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981)
[W]e must be mindful that directors are passing judgment on fellow
directors in the same corporation and fellow directors, in this
instance, who designated them to serve both as directors and
[special litigation] committee members . . . And the further
question arises whether inquiry as to independence, good faith and
reasonable investigation is sufficient safeguard against abuse,
perhaps subconscious abuse.
115. Sandys v. Pincus, 152 A.3d 124, 126 (Del. 2016).
116. See Yaron Nili, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Case for Improving
Director Independence Disclosure, 43 J. CORP. L. 35, 62–63 (2017).
117. See id. at 47 n.65 (“For instance, in Oracle, it was determined that
personal connections rose to the level of impeding independence, while in
Beam the opposite was held.”); see also In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d at
510 n.37 (“Even in the context of personal, rather than financial, relationships,
the materiality requirement does not mean that the test cannot be met.”).
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business judgment rule to a particular action without
necessarily implying much about other aspects of governance.118
As such, it does not purport to provide an assurance of ongoing
independent monitorship in general but rather formal
independence as to a particular policy or transaction. 119 Where
Delaware courts address independence, they routinely dismiss
charges of bias in the absence of visible financial ties, the
presence of a controlling shareholder, or both.120
A 2016 decision, Sandys v. Pincus,121 provides a mixed
example. The case turned on the question whether a majority of
the board of the videogame maker Zynga, Inc. was independent,
and thus whether business judgment rule immunity attached to
a board decision exempting directors and the CEO from
company policy restricting the timing of trades of Zynga stock.122
Plaintiffs alleged that three directors had impermissibly close
ties to the CEO, one in the personal sphere and the other two
for professional reasons.123 One director co-owned a plane with
the CEO, which for the court “signaled an extremely close,
personal bond” that suggests “the type of very close personal
relationship that, like family ties, one would expect to heavily

118. See, e.g., In re Tesla Motors, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 12711–VCS, 2018
WL 1560293, at *13 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2018) (noting that the requisite degree
of control can be shown either to exist generally or with regard to the
particular transaction in question); see also In re Oracle Corp. Derivative
Litig., No. 2017-0337-SG, 2018 WL 1381331, at *16 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 2018)
(discussing independence in the specific context of a demand).
119. See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 2018 WL 1381331, at *17
(deeming each entanglement insufficient on its own “to imply lack of
independence,” but holding that the allegations taken together created
reasonable doubt about the ability of independent directors to objectively
evaluate a demand to sue).
120. See infra Parts III–IV.
121. 152 A.3d 124 (Del. 2016).
122. See id. at 128 (“To plead demand excusal under Rales, the plaintiff
must plead particularized factual allegations that ‘create a reasonable doubt
that, as of the time the complaint [was] filed, the board of directors could have
properly exercised its independent and disinterested business judgment in
responding to a demand.’” (quoting Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 (Del.
1993))).
123. Id. at 126.

Shill.ICErecon (Do Not Delete)

THE INDEPENDENT BOARD AS SHIELD

1/15/2021 5:06 PM

1835

influence a human’s ability to exercise impartial judgment.”124
The court focused much of its analysis on the significance of this
jointly owned asset, which constituted virtually the entire basis
for the inference it reached that this director was not
independent.125 Given the unusual nature of this arrangement,
the court’s determination of its significance should not be taken
to suggest that ties between independents and managers will be
scrutinized more closely in general.
The court’s analysis of the other two directors’
relationships, however, arguably suggests a more expansive
view of the independence inquiry. Plaintiffs alleged that
investment and director interlocks between these directors’ firm
and Zynga meant the directors were not independent.126 The
court acknowledged the need for Delaware law to allow
“mutually beneficial ongoing business relationship[s],” but
found it “reasonable to expect that sort of relationship might
have a material effect on the parties’ ability to act adversely
toward each other.”127 In conjunction with the controlling
shareholder status of the CEO—an important factor—the court
held that these linkages created reasonable doubt about the
independence of Gordon and Doerr for purposes of demand
excusal.128
Bracketing its status as a controlling shareholder case,
Sandys may signal that Delaware courts will scrutinize more
124. Id. at 130 (“Co-ownership of a private plane involves a partnership in
a personal asset that is not only very expensive, but that also requires close
cooperation in use, which is suggestive of detailed planning indicative of a
continuing, close personal friendship”). This relates to director Ellen Siminoff.
125. See id. at 129–31 (stating facts in support of the inference that
Siminoff would not be able to act impartially when deciding whether to move
forward with a suit implicating a close friend with whom she owned a private
plane). The dissent’s entire discussion of Siminoff, too, focused on the meaning
of co-ownership of a plane. Id. at 137–38 (Valihura, J., dissenting).
126. In addition to owning a sizable chunk (9.2 percent) of Zynga’s equity,
the venture capital firm, Kleiner Perkins, also invested in a company
co-founded by the CEO’s wife and in a third company that (yet another)
Kleiner Perkins director of Zynga is invested in and on whose board he sits.
Id. at 131, 133–34 (majority opinion).
127. Id. at 134 (“Causing a lawsuit to be brought against another person
is no small matter, and is the sort of thing that might plausibly endanger a
relationship.”).
128. See id. (applying Rales).
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closely ties between managers and nominally independent
directors. However, its facts included highly visible,
well-evidenced personal ties and close financial and professional
ties between the challenged directors and the CEO.129 Moreover,
the case does not urge or imply a reconsideration of the
application of the business judgment rule to conflict
transactions approved by such directors. It is unlikely that
Sandys suggests a shift away from the independent board’s
shielding function.
2.

Federal Securities Law

While the independentness of the board as a whole is not
regulated by federal law, two sources of federal legislation
require independence at the board committee level. The first is
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002130 which regulates accounting
practices at public companies.131 Implementing regulations
assign the audit committee direct legal responsibility for
overseeing the engagement of the company’s independent
auditor and prescribe certain rules designed to ensure the
integrity of that process.132 Audit firms, in turn, must be
“qualified and independent of their audit clients both in fact and
in appearance.”133
Sarbanes-Oxley mandates that public companies use
independent audit committees. The statute achieves this
129. See id. at 130 (“That argument is that owning an airplane together is
not a common thing, and suggests that the Pincus and Siminoff families are
extremely close to each other and are among each other’s most important and
intimate friends.”).
130. Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745.
131. See generally id.
132. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A–3(b)(2) (2020) (providing that audit
committees “must be directly responsible for the appointment, compensation,
retention and oversight of the work of any registered public accounting firm
engaged” for audit purposes).
133. See Preliminary Note to § 210.2–01, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2–01 (2020). The
test for “appearance” is the perspective of a reasonable investor, and examples
are furnished. See id. 3(b) (stating that a reasonable, informed investor would
not conclude that the accountant is “not . . . capable of exercising objective and
impartial judgment,” articulating standards for auditor independence, and
providing a non-exclusive list of hypothetical auditor-client relationships
lacking independence).
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indirectly, by requiring stock exchanges to adopt rules requiring
their use by listed firms.134 All individual members of public
company audit committees must, in turn, “be independent.”135
Audit committee members are specifically barred from
consulting or doing other work for the company beyond their
board service.136 They also “must otherwise be independent,”137
by for example, meeting stock exchange tests for
independence.138
A second statute, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010,139 adopted following the
financial crisis and Great Recession, accomplishes something
similar for public company compensation committees. 140 Like
Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank does not impose its requirement
directly but rather conscripts stock exchanges into regulating
independence—here,
of
compensation
committee
composition.141 It is less interventionist than Sarbanes-Oxley,
however, in that it merely directs stock exchanges to “consider”
consulting relationships and other affiliations between directors
and issuers, rather than requiring them to bar such
relationships outright.142 Nonetheless, the stock exchanges have
134. See id. § 240.10A-3(b). The stock exchange rules requiring
independent audit committees are the Listed Company Manual, § 303A.07
Audit Committee Additional Requirements, N.Y. STOCK EXCH.,
https://perma.cc/A259-KHLZ and the Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules, supra note 17,
§ 5605(c)(2)(A).
135. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)(1)(i).
136. See id. § 240.10A-3(b)(1)(ii)–(iii) (“[A] member of the audit
committee . . . may not . . . [a]ccept directly or indirectly any consulting,
advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer or any subsidiary
thereof . . . .”).
137. Id. § 240.10A-3(b)(1)(i) (emphasis added).
138. See infra Part II.B.
139. Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376.
140. See generally id.
141. See Dodd-Frank Act § 952 (requiring that each member of the
compensation committee of the board of directors of an issuer be a member of
the board of directors of the issuer and otherwise be independent); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10C-1(b)(1)(i) (2020) (same).
142. Arguably, the fact that Dodd-Frank was less interventionist with
regard to board independence than Sarbanes-Oxley, notwithstanding that the
crisis that led to it was far more serious, is in tension with a common criticism
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required that all compensation committee members be
independent.143
3.

Stock Exchange Regulation

The third major source of board independence rules is stock
exchange regulation. In 2003, both leading U.S. stock
exchanges, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq,
began requiring boards of listed companies to consist of a
majority of independent directors.144 NYSE’s official rationale
for this rule is set forth in the commentary accompanying its
rule: “[e]ffective boards of directors exercise independent
judgment,” and independent-dominated boards “will increase
the quality of board oversight and lessen the possibility of
damaging conflicts of interest.”145 The Nasdaq rationale is
similar.146 Both exchanges require that directors’ independent
status be determined affirmatively by the board.147
of crisis-driven regulation—namely, that it is excessively responsive to the
passions of the moment. See Luigi Zingales, The Future of Securities
Regulation, 47 J. ACCT. RSCH. 391, 397 (2009) (observing inadequacies in
crisis-driven regulatory interventions).
143. Listed Company Manual, § 303A.05 Compensation Committee, N.Y.
STOCK EXCH., https://perma.cc/2V9J-YEQN; Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules, supra
note 17, § 5605-5(d)(2)(A).
144. See Listed Company Manual, § 303A.01 Independent Directors, supra
note 17 (“Listed companies must have a majority of independent directors.”);
Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules, supra note 17, § 5605(b)(1) (“A majority of the board
of directors must be comprised of Independent Directors . . . .”).
145. Listed Company Manual, § 303A.01 Independent Directors, supra
note 17.
146. See Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules, supra note 17, § 5605(b)(1)(A) (stating
that independent directors “play an important role in assuring investor
confidence. Through the exercise of independent judgment, they act on behalf
of investors to maximize shareholder value in the Companies they oversee and
guard against conflicts of interest.”).
147. See Listed Company Manual, § 303A.02 Independence Tests, N.Y.
STOCK EXCH., https://perma.cc/34JY-HHHJ (“No director qualifies as
‘independent’ unless the board of directors affirmatively determines that the
director has no material relationship with the listed company (either directly
or as a partner, shareholder or officer of an organization that has a
relationship with the company).”); Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules, supra note 17,
§ 5605(a)(2) (“The board has a responsibility to make an affirmative
determination that no such relationships exist through the application of Rule
5605(a)(2).”).
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Crucially, satisfying the exchanges’ independence rules is a
sina qua non of listing, but does not provide much practical
assurance that firms, once listed, will either maintain the
required proportion of independent directors or the mandated
levels of independence among those directors.148 No meaningful
mechanism exists for shareholders or others to enforce these
rules at the exchange level.149 In principle, the offending
company could be delisted, but removing the company from the
exchange—and for that matter, the enforcement by exchanges
of any of their own rules against companies—is extremely
rare.150
The exchanges’ standards specify two categories of
relationship that disqualify directors from being considered
independent, one objective and the other subjective.151 NYSE’s
objective rules deny independent status to anyone employed by
the company (and anyone whose immediate family member was
employed as an executive officer) in the previous three years;152
anyone who has received more than a certain amount of money
in direct compensation from the company during the previous
three years, with certain limited exceptions;153 anyone with
148. See Nili, supra note 116, at 40 (“[T]he current regulatory approach
has also lacked effective enforcement.”).
149. See id. (“Companies’ self-designations of director independence are
left uncontested and are done without proper vetting or auditing by the stock
exchanges or the SEC, as they have shown no effort to proactively enforce their
own requirements.”).
150. See infra Part III.C.
151. Item 407 of Regulation S-K adds a securities regulation layer to this
mandate, requiring that independent directors be identified as such on the
issuer’s proxy or, in the case of a company conducting an initial public offering,
in its registration statement. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(a) (2020) (incorporating
by reference the exchanges’ own standards for their listed companies). This
regulation does not constitute a freestanding federal law requirement that
companies maintain independent boards, however.
152. See Listed Company Manual, § 303A.02 Independence Tests, supra
note 147.
153. See id. § 303A.02(b)(ii) (establishing a limit of $120,000 in direct
compensation in any twelve-month period during the prior three years,
excluding fees paid for director or committee service or pension, “other forms
of deferred compensation for prior service (provided such compensation is not
contingent in any way on continued service),” and any compensation received
for service as interim chairman or in an interim executive capacity).
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close relationships to the company’s independent auditor;154 and
directors with a few other types of particularly salient
conflicts.155 Nasdaq’s objective rules are substantially
identical.156
In addition to these objective criteria, both exchanges have
adopted high-level, qualitative standards concerning the
definition of independence. NYSE’s standard provides that
directors who have any “material relationship with the listed
company (either directly or as a partner, shareholder or officer
of an organization that has a relationship with the company)”
cannot be deemed independent.157 In acknowledgment of the
porousness of this definition, the commentary to the NYSE rules
expresses a need to “broadly consider all relevant facts and
circumstances.”158 For example, when making its independence
determination, the board should consider the question of
materiality “not merely from the standpoint of the director, but
also from that of persons or organizations with which the
director has an affiliation.”159 Relationships that should be
deemed material under the NYSE standard “can include
commercial, industrial, banking, consulting, legal, accounting,
charitable and familial relationships, among others.” 160 Notably
absent from this list is direct mention of close personal
friendships, though the language of the list is illustrative rather

154. See id. § 303A.02(b)(iii)(A) (stating that a director cannot be
considered independent if he is an employee of the company’s auditor).
155. See id. § 303A.02(b)(iv) (concerning conflicts arising from
compensation committee interlocks); id. § 303A.02(b)(v) (concerning conflicts
arising from outside employment with a company doing over $1 million in
business with the listed company); id. § 303A.02 (noting that in certain cases,
contributions to charities of which an independent director serves as an
executive officer must be disclosed); see also Nili, supra note 116, at 49–50
(concerning, e.g., compensation committee membership).
156. See Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules, supra note 17, § 5605(a)(2).
157. Listed Company Manual, § 303A.02 Independence Tests, supra note
147 (emphasis added).
158. Id. (noting the impossibility of gauging all factors that “might bear on
the materiality of a director’s relationship”).
159. Id.
160. Id. (“[A]s the concern is independence from management, the
Exchange does not view ownership of even a significant amount of stock, by
itself, as a bar to an independence finding.”(emphasis added)).
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than exhaustive and, based on other language in the
commentary, prudence demands that boards consider such
relationships.161
The Nasdaq qualitative standard sets a higher bar for
independence than its NYSE counterpart. This is clear from the
plain text of the Nasdaq definition of relationships that would
disqualify a director from being considered independent: it lacks
a materiality requirement, instead barring any complicating
relationship.162 The exchange’s commentary explains that this
standard prohibits independent directors from having merely “a
relationship with the listed Company that would impair [the
director’s] independence;” there is no discussion of
materiality.163 The only major exception to the NYSE and

161. For example, boards are required to weigh “all relevant facts and
circumstances” bearing on independence. Id. (“It is not possible to anticipate,
or explicitly to provide for, all circumstances that might signal potential
conflicts of interest, or that might bear on the materiality of a director’s
relationship to a listed company.”).
162. Nasdaq defines an independent director as “a person other than an
Executive Officer or employee of the Company or any other individual having
a relationship which, in the opinion of the Company’s board of directors, would
interfere with the exercise of independent judgment in carrying out the
responsibilities of a director.” Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules, supra note 17,
§ 5605(a)(2) (emphasis added).
163. Id. § 5605(a)(2) IM-5605 (emphasis added). The absence of a
materiality requirement in both the standard and the commentary is
significant. While NYSE requires relationships to be “material” to be
disqualifying from an independence standpoint, Nasdaq would deny that label
to a director with any relationship that would interfere with her independence,
a formulation that would appear to more easily reach personal relationships.
Id. That the Nasdaq rules use the term “material” repeatedly to refer to other
types of conflicts bolsters the notion that the rule drafters deliberately omitted
it in the context of independence. See, e.g., id. § 5605(d)(2)(A) (concerning
“material” relationships of compensation committee members); Gregory H.
Shill, The Golden Leash and the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty, 64 UCLA L. REV.
1246, 1265–66 (2017) (discussing the distinction between NYSE and Nasdaq
rules concerning director relationships); cf. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S.
16, 23 (1983) (“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section
of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion or exclusion.” (citations omitted)).
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Nasdaq
requirement
that
listed
companies
adopt
164
majority-independent boards is for controlled companies.
As a formal matter, both NYSE and Nasdaq place the
process of nominating directors in the hands of independent
directors. NYSE accomplishes this by requiring that listed firms
constitute a nominating and governance committee composed
exclusively of independent directors.165 Nasdaq requires that
nominees be selected either by an all-independent nominating
committee or by the independent members of a
majority-independent board.166
Though they exclude direct management participation in
the process, the degree of authentic (as opposed to formal)
independence mandated by these rules is debatable. For
example, both exchanges allow companies to change the
decisionmakers contractually, by granting to a shareholder the
exclusive right to nominate a director.167 But the more
important qualification, discussed infra at Part III.A., is the
extraordinary influence management exercises over the process
from top to bottom.
***
Past work urging improvements to the independent director
model has tended to focus on relatively modest
changes—tightening up the definition of independence and
164. See Listed Company Manual, § 303A.00 Introduction, supra note 80
(exempting NYSE-listed controlled companies from the independent-board
requirement); Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules, supra note 17, § 5615(c) (same for
Nasdaq-listed controlled companies).
165. See Listed Company Manual, § 303A.04(a)–(b) Nominating/
Corporate Governance Committee, supra note 79 (requiring companies to
establish “a nominating/corporate governance committee composed entirely of
independent directors” to identify and nominate “individuals qualified to
become board members”); Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee
Functions and Communications Between Security Holders and Boards of
Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 8340, 81 SEC Docket 2135 (Nov. 24,
2003) (requiring disclosures for nominating committees and boards).
166. See Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules, supra note 17, § 5605(e).
167. See Listed Company Manual, § 303A.04(a) Nominating/Corporate
Governance Committee, supra note 79; Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules, supra note
17, § 5605(e)(4). Typically, such a right would be exchanged for something of
value, such as a standstill provision in a settlement agreement with an activist
shareholder that stipulates the shareholder will cease trading the company’s
stock.
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improving the quality of disclosures around it,168 for example, or
enhancing the autonomy of the independent director in
general169 or in controlled companies in particular.170 These
commendable ideas are styled in the nature of friendly
amendments to the current paradigm. As such, they do not seek
to address shortcomings inherent in the independent board of
substituting outside directors for judicial and regulatory
oversight. Those shortcomings are most consequential in the
sphere of board action where independent directors wield the
power to activate the business judgment rule.
III. Limitations of the Independent Board
Independent directors must satisfy legal criteria detailed in
Part II, but even the sum of these requirements falls short of
authentic independence in the ordinary sense of the word.
“Independent” has such meanings as “not subject to control by
others,” “not requiring or relying on something else,” and “not
looking to others for one’s opinions or for guidance in
conduct.”171 Independent directors labor under well-documented
limitations that require them to seek management guidance
and grant management a considerable measure of control over
them.172 These deficits hinder independents’ capacity and

168. See Nili, supra note 116, at 70–74 (describing how disclosure
requirements can be altered to improve the independent director regime).
Elsewhere, Nili has cautioned against excessive reliance on the independent
board. See Yaron Nili, The Fallacy of Director Independence, 2020 WISC. L.
REV. 491 (2020).
169 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside
Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 865
(1991) (proposing increased independence from management through
increased dependence on shareholders).
170. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Independent Directors
and Controlling Shareholders, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1271, 1295 (2017) (describing
a regime to give independent directors more power with changes such as veto
rights).
171. Independent, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
172. Fairfax, supra note 83, at 132 (“[T]here exist significant limitations
on independent directors’ ability to fulfill their monitoring role, and it is very
difficult to overcome those limitations, especially as independent directors’
responsibilities increase.”).
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incentives and predictably generate boards that shield
managers.173
The aspirational literature regarding the independent
board and its potential to improve governance and performance
is difficult to square with the evidence. Independent directors
tend to be “thinly informed, under-resourced, and boundedly
motivated,”174 and “more independent of shareholders than they
are of management.”175 Proposed fixes abound.176 Some
changes—to the composition, structure, and incentives of board
membership, for example—have been adopted with a view to
“reduc[ing]
deviations
from
shareholder-value
maximization.”177 Yet managers may frequently “exert
excessive influence over [board] governance mechanisms,
exploiting a collective action barrier to effective monitoring by
dispersed equity owners.” 178 This Part reviews factors that
chronically impair effective supervision by independent boards.
A.

Structural Bias, Self-Interest, and Social Perception

Boards of directors are subject to many of the same
propensities that characterize decision-making by other groups
of human beings.179 This fact colors their decisions on key
173. See id. at 177 (“[D]ependence, coupled with the social ties and
structural bias common among directors, significantly hinders independent
directors’ ability to be impartial.”).
174. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 52, at 366.
175. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 169, at 873.
176. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 170, at 1293–95 (proposing
“enhanced-independence” directors); Nili, supra note 116, at 70–76 (proposing
to increase independent director disclosure requirements); Ronald J. Gilson &
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors
and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 912 (2013);
Bebchuk, supra note 20, at 151 (proposing giving more power to the
shareholders); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 169, at 865 (advocating
reforms to “increas[e] the dependence of outside directors on shareholders”).
177. Bebchuk, supra note 20, at 850. Questions around whether the
purpose of the firm should remain solely to maximize shareholder wealth are
beyond the scope of this Article.
178. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 47, at 1865.
179. See Antony Page, Unconscious Bias and the Limits of Director
Independence, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 237, 259 (2009) (“Although people are
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matters of corporate policy, even where their self-interest may
not be directly implicated. For example, directors might ask
themselves:
[S]hould we approve the CEO compensation package? (Yes,
because he is like us, a member of my group, and thus he
deserves it; and for directors who are also CEOs, yes, because
it may favorably affect my own compensation.) Should we
approve another firm’s takeover bid of our company? (No,
because we have managed the firm well and because I want
to retain the benefits associated with board membership.)
Should we allow a derivative suit to go forward? (No, because
this involves a suit against a group of which I am a
member . . . .).180

The human frailties referenced in parentheses have been
documented in an extensive literature.
1.

Social Biases

Regardless of their formal status as independent, directors
sometimes exhibit what psychologists call ingroup bias, or “the
tendency to favor one’s own group, its members, its
characteristics, and its products, particularly in reference to
other groups.”181 Such directors, even when acting in good faith,
may be unconsciously biased in favor of other directors because
they view other board members as part of their group.182 This
can contribute to a structural bias—“the bias resulting from
board members’ interactions with one another after joining the

aware of many biases, they will frequently not recognize situations involving
potential bias and conflict of interest.”).
180. Id.
181. APA Dictionary of Psychology, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, https://perma.cc
/FWG9-9YBB.
182. See Page, supra note 179, at 252 (“Directors, even those defined as
independent, are members of the board of directors and, so the theory goes,
are likely to be biased in favor of other directors.”); Fairfax, supra note 83, at
153 (“[T]he psychological research with respect to structural bias is
particularly relevant in the context of boards, highlighting the degree to which
such bias undermines directors’ ability to be critical of their fellow directors.”).
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board”183—that, in Lisa Fairfax’s formulation, “makes it
normatively difficult to have truly independent directors.”184
While scholars of corporate boards often advocate changes
to the incentives or independence levels of directors, “powerful
psychological factors are at work within the boardroom” 185 that
can render such initiatives moot. These forces “creat[e] a
cohesive, loyal, conforming ingroup that will support its
members for positive and negative reasons, under low and high
levels of motivation and group values.”186 Personal and
professional connections, typical among board members, can
exacerbate ingroup or structural bias,187 and this effect can be
more pronounced where, as is often the case, boards are
relatively homogeneous in makeup.188 Efforts to address other
problems in the independent board often create tradeoffs in this

183. Yaron Nili, The “New Insiders”: Rethinking Independent Directors’
Tenure, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 97, 118 (2016).
184. Fairfax, supra note 83, at 153; see Page, supra note 179, at 245–56
‘(describing different kinds of bias).
185. James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom:
Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 99 (“Prior or ongoing interaction
between individuals, called interpersonal familiarity in the psychological
literature, has been repeatedly demonstrated to be a source for strong biases
favoring a familiar ingroup and correlatively disfavoring a threatening or
unfamiliar outgroup.”).
186. Id.
187. See Page, supra note 179, at 252 (“Director nominees will often be
friends or have social connections with other board members, thereby
exacerbating biases.”); Nili, supra note 183, at 118 (noting preexisting social
ties and length of director service as factors that could affect true
independence).
188. See Page, supra note 179, at 253 (“Today directors still tend to have
relatively strong ties and similarities, as they tend to be fairly homogeneous.
More generally, groups that are essentially self-selecting will often have
homogeneous attitudes, since people naturally tend to form relationships with
those who are similar.”). Despite movement towards greater gender and racial
diversity at the board level, in 2018, over 60 percent of directorships at the top
100 companies were held by white males. See DELOITTE, MISSING PIECES
REPORT: THE 2018 BOARD DIVERSITY CENSUS OF WOMEN AND MINORITIES ON
FORTUNE 500 BOARDS 9 (2019) (“The representation of women and minorities
in the Fortune 100 has reached a high of 38.6 percent, outpacing the broader
Fortune 500, which is 34 percent.”).
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area.189 For example, longer director tenure, traditionally
promoted as a way of enhancing director knowledge and
effectiveness, can intensify this problem: over time, ties among
directors are likely to strengthen, as they become more likely to
identify as part of the group, thus reducing diligence and
monitoring.190
Delaware law acknowledges the potential for structural
bias among independent directors, but the response it has
developed—doctrines that regulate conflicts in individual
transactions—ignore the constant, systemic nature of the
problem.191 The result is that, with the exception of takeover
defenses (on which more shortly), Delaware law effectively rules
out structural bias as a basis for challenging the independent
status of a director.
2.

Directors’ Desire to Be Renominated to the Board

Nowhere are social biases more consequential than in the
process of determining who sits on the board. Delaware law
recognizes that directors may be biased in favor of actions that
preserve their seats192 along with the pecuniary and
non-pecuniary benefits they bring.193 But the question has
special bite when it comes to the question of being renominated
to the board or recommended for other boards or executive
roles.194
189. See Nili, supra note 183, at 118 (highlighting the tension and
tradeoffs between tenure, social connections, and structural bias).
190. See id. (“Importantly, tenure potentially affects not only preexisting
and newly formed social ties with management, but also increases this
structural bias, making it less likely that any single director would be willing
to voice an opinion if such opinion might jeopardize the close-knit atmosphere
of the boardroom.”).
191. See infra Parts III–IV.
192. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del.
1985) (discussing this phenomenon in the context of boards weighing takeover
defenses).
193. See Page, supra note 179, at 253–55 (noting that directorship benefits
include compensation, access to firm resources such as charitable donations,
social validation, and valuable skills or contacts).
194. See id. at 255 (“Directors thus are likely biased in favor of decisions
that allow them to continue as directors, including decisions in favor of those
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As a formal matter, public company director nominations
and renominations are generally committed to the independent
directorate.195 Nevertheless, CEOs “have had considerable and
sometimes decisive influence over the nomination process,”196
even when they have “not formally serv[ed] on the nominating
committee.”197 In some cases it may even be said that
“management effectively controls director nomination.”198 For a
rational CEO, there is little more important than the identity of
the company’s independent directors. Such directors are
uniquely positioned to cleanse conduct that falls within a gray
zone of personally benefiting the CEO while producing some
theoretical or minimal benefit to the corporation.199 Managers,
therefore, can be expected to prioritize the nomination and
renomination of friendly directors.200
The most important step in becoming a director is being
selected as a nominee. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried wrote
in 2004 that “candidates placed on the company’s slate by the
board have been virtually assured of being reelected.” 201 In
recent years, this trend has not abated.202 Directors of Russell
3000 companies received average shareholder “for” votes
people who determine future board membership, such as a controlling
shareholder or those directors serving on nomination committees.”); Nili,
supra note 183, at 122 (“Because the overwhelming majority of director
elections are uncontested, inclusion in the company’s ballot is paramount to a
director’s ability to be elected and to subsequently hold her seat.”).
195. See supra Part II.
196. LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE:
THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 26 (2004).
197. Id.
198. Nili, supra note 183, at 122.
199. See id. (describing the dependency that directors have on
management to get reelected).
200. See id. (“This current structure of director election, where
management effectively controls director nomination, puts directors in a
potentially compromised position, and forces them to consider the
ramifications for their reelection if they choose to confront management or
their peer directors.”).
201. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 196, at 25.
202. See THE CONFERENCE BOARD, PROXY VOTING ANALYTICS (2016–2019)
AND 2020 SEASON PREVIEW 34 fig.1.3 (2019), https://perma.cc/7SN6-DDPM
(PDF) (showing that the trend to elect candidates appointed by the board has
continued).
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exceeding 95 percent in every year between 2016 and 2019.203 In
that window’s most challenging proxy season, fewer than 3
percent of incumbent directors failed to exceed 70 percent
support, and 99.7 percent—all but 54 directors out of
16,492—received majority support.204 Directors have no serious
incentive to oppose management and every incentive to stay in
its good graces, since doing so virtually assures renomination
and reelection.
These basic facts contradict the assumptions of Delaware
law, which expects directors to pretend that no consequences
will attach if they take a more active role in disciplining
managers or their fellow directors.205 Delaware law goes so far
as to presume that directors are unlikely to make decisions that
would jeopardize their reputation as impartial.206 Implicit in
this logic is the notion that directors are less responsible to their
CEOs and director peers than to a higher-order, objective
reputational interest that will judge them harshly for going
along to get along. There is neither much evidence nor reason to
believe that directors interpret their fiduciary duties so nobly,
or that the director labor market punishes deferential directors
or rewards active ones.207 Reputation is a relational concept, and
“it seems likely that the group or self-interested decision is not
one that carries any reputational risk.”208 Rather, “the relevant

203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1052 (Del. 2004) (demonstrating
that directors are assumed to think there is no consequence for actively
disciplining others in the company).
206. See id. (noting that directors are presumed not to be more willing to
risk their reputation than risk the relationship with the director or officer
whose conduct is challenged).
207. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Andrew Lund & Robert J. Schonlau,
Do Outside Directors Face Labor Market Consequences? A Natural Experiment
from the Financial Crisis, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 53, 64–75 (2014) (finding that
for outside directors at financial institutions, the exogenous shock of the 2008
financial crisis only raised the probability of a director being replaced for poor
firm performance a tiny amount (a difference of 40 basis points, or 0.99 percent
at financial firms versus 0.59 percent at non-financials)).
208. Page, supra note 179, at 256.

Shill.ICErecon (Do Not Delete)

1850

1/15/2021 5:06 PM

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1811 (2020)

reputation for directors is the one among their peers, who face
the same issues and are likely to be quite sympathetic.”209
Since directors, once suggested by the nominating
committee, are typically nominated by the board, the recent
trend towards holding director elections annually rather than
every three years may exacerbate the problem of directorial bias
as it can be expected to make directors more attentive to their
colleagues’ perceptions of them.210 Thus, a director’s desire to
retain a favorable professional reputation among both the
managers and her current peers on the board—and her
potential future peers on other boards and C-suites—may lead
to less active monitoring, in contrast to the greater diligence
envisioned by the Delaware Supreme Court.
B.

Evidentiary Barriers

While Delaware law admits of the potential for structural
or ingroup bias to compromise the independence of directors, it
makes it nearly impossible to demonstrate. One example of a
situation where such bias commonly arises is where a
shareholder plaintiff claims the board is incapable of passing
judgment impartially on a derivative suit demand because a
majority of the directors are not independent.211 In an early case
addressing the issue, the Delaware Supreme Court admonished
that “we must be mindful that directors are passing judgment
on fellow directors in the same corporation . . . who [may have]
designated them to serve both as directors and committee
members.”212 Read together, three cases illustrate how this
language has remained largely aspirational.
First, in a civil lawsuit over allegations of insider trading at
Martha Stewart’s company, the court observed that
209. Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review,
82 WASH. U. L.Q. 821, 859–60 (2004).
210. See Nili, supra note 183, at 122–23 (arguing that because a majority
of boards “now face annual elections,” “[t]he continued dependency on
management . . . could potentially make these directors even more concerned
about their reelection and securing management and peer support, as they
now are granted only one-year terms”).
211. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981)
(demonstrating the difficulty of demonstrating ingroup bias in the law).
212. Id. (emphasis added).
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“[i]ndependence is a fact-specific determination made in the
context of a particular case.”213 Plaintiffs alleging a lack of
independence face a difficult burden of proof: allegations of a
“mere personal friendship or a mere outside business
relationship, standing alone, are insufficient,” i.e., they do not
“raise a reasonable doubt about a director’s independence.”214 To
meet that burden, such that putatively independent directors
can be found unable to act impartially, their friendship with the
director or officer whose conduct is at issue must be of a
“bias-producing nature.”215 Specifically, that bias must
overcome a presumption of loyalty: she must be shown to prefer
to risk her reputation than risk her relationship with the
interested director or officer.216
In practice, courts have been extremely reluctant to find a
conflict undermining impartiality absent an external, material
signifier of a close relationship. For example, in Sandys,
described supra at Part II, the Delaware Supreme Court held
that shared ownership of a private plane by a putatively
independent director and the company CEO “signaled an
extremely close, personal bond” akin to family and supported an
inference that that director would not be able to act impartially
with regard to a suit against the CEO.217 The court reached a
similar conclusion regarding other directors based on financial
interconnections.218 A dissenting Justice would have found the
directors, including the one who shared a plane with the CEO,

213. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1049.
214. Id. at 1050 (emphasis added); see id. (“In order to show lack of
independence, the complaint of a stockholder-plaintiff must create a
reasonable doubt that a director is not so ‘beholden’ to an interested director
(in this case Stewart) that his or her ‘discretion would be sterilized.’”).
215. See id. (stating that the decision in question concerned actions
adverse to Stewart, to whom it was alleged the directors met the Delaware
standard of beholdenness).
216. See id. at 1052 (“[P]laintiff must plead facts that would support the
inference that because of the nature of a relationship[,] . . . the non-interested
director would be more willing to risk his or her reputation than risk the
relationship with the interested director.”).
217. Sandys v. Pincus, 152 A.3d 124, 130 (Del. 2016).
218. See id. at 131–34 (finding that personal bonds and personal
interconnections can produce bias).
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independent (as the lower court had).219 In another case,
involving the board of Oracle Corporation, the court reached the
same conclusion—that directors lacked independence—but only
upon a showing of significant financial and professional
interlocks, including essentially a joint investment in real
property between a director and the CEO.220
It would be a mistake to read Sandys and this Oracle case221
as generally suggestive of a trend towards more exacting
standards of independence, for they had two unusual facts in
common. In each case, the board had previously determined that
one or more directors whose independence was challenged in the
suit did not meet the pertinent stock exchange’s standards for
independence,222 which are arguably less exacting than
Delaware’s.223 In addition, the CEO in each case also had the
status of (or was plausibly alleged to have been) a controller of
the corporation.224 While such a designation does not
automatically trigger a finding that directors lack the requisite
characteristics of independence, the court in Sandys
emphasized that the existence of a controlling shareholder in
the company was relevant to its determination that three
219. See id. at 134–35 (Valihura, J., dissenting) (finding that the directors
were independent because the plaintiff failed to allege any facts that would
establish a material relationship).
220. See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., No. 2017-0337-SG, 2018 WL
1381331, at *19 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 2018) (showing that together with her
husband, one director owned two condos on an island 98 percent owned by the
CEO).
221. A note of disambiguation: there are a great many Delaware corporate
law cases in the past few decades to which the Oracle Corporation lends its
name. They do not necessarily relate to one another.
222. See Sandys, 152 A.3d at 131 (noting that Zynga disclosed to the
exchange on which its shares were listed, Nasdaq, that two directors were not
independent); In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation, 2018 WL 1381331, at
*18 (making the same determination with regard to one director’s
independence under NYSE listing standards).
223. See supra Part II.
224. See Sandys, 152 A.3d at 126 (stating that the CEO was a controlling
shareholder); In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 2018 WL 1381331, at *16
(declining to determine whether the CEO was a controlling shareholder, but
noting his status as a 28 percent owner and co-founder of the company and
describing plaintiffs’ allegation that he “maintain[ed] a firm grip on Oracle’s
day-to-day operations”).
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directors were not independent.225 In sum, not only was the close
nature of the relationship in each case evidenced by tangible
pecuniary connections, but the company itself had determined
that directors whose independence was challenged had in fact
failed a key test of independence—and the specter of
controller-initiated removal loomed over the directors of both
boards.
As discussed infra at Part IV, takeovers are something of
an exception to Delaware’s lax treatment of structural bias. In
such cases, courts take cognizance of the potential for structural
bias and apply an enhanced scrutiny standard (rather than the
deferential business judgment standard) when evaluating the
validity of defenses adopted by the board.226 While courts apply
a formally heightened standard of review in these cases, they
also validate the challenged measures even when the effect of
doing so is to indefinitely entrench managers by allowing them
to “just say no” to takeovers.227
C.

Self-Interested and Uninformative Self-Designations of
Independence

The systems used to define and designate directors as
independent are characterized by a lack of rigor, coherence,
accountability, and transparency. Under state law, federal law,
and stock exchange listing requirements, the board of directors
determines the independence of its own directors in the first
instance.228 This determination, which is subject to the influence
225. See Sandys, 152 A.3d at 133 (“[O]ur courts cannot blind themselves
to that reality when considering whether a director on a controlled company
board has other ties to the controller beyond her relationship at the controlled
company.”).
226. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del.
1985)
Because of the omnipresent specter [when a board addresses a
pending takeover bid] that a board may be acting primarily in its
own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its
shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial
examination at the threshold before the protections of the business
judgment rule may be conferred.
227. See id. at 954; infra Part IV.C.1.
228. See supra Part II.
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of the same self-interested and ingroup propensities discussed
above, is preliminary in theory but often final in fact.229
Under Delaware law, the only way to challenge a board’s
incantation of director independence is by lawsuit, where a
plaintiff must identify and attack a specific board decision and
satisfy procedural and substantive requirements before being
entitled to any discovery on the very question she is litigating.230
Stock exchanges retain the authority to take disciplinary
measures to enforce their listing standards, up to and including
delisting; in practice, however, they rarely enforce their own
rules.231 For example, “in 2017, the NYSE brought twenty-five
disciplinary actions, but none of them involved disclosure/listing
rules violations.”232 Exchanges are in competition for business
and lack an incentive to enforce strictly,233 and the federal
securities laws do not provide a private right of action for a
violation of exchange rules.234 A plaintiff could in theory bring a
federal securities fraud suit over false disclosures regarding
director independence in a company’s proxy statement, but an

229. See, e.g., Nili, supra note 116, at 53–63.
230. See id. at 63 (“[S]tate law enforcement is limited to litigation, and
while shareholders can challenge the independence of directors in Delaware
courts, these challenges must be made in connection with a shareholder
challenge to a specific board action, and must cross procedural and substantive
thresholds before discovery.”).
231. See id. (“[I]n the context of the stock exchange listing rules, the
designation of directors as independent is designed to be difficult to enforce,
and in practice is rarely enforced.”).
232. Timothy J. Johnston, Is Mandatory Real-Time Disclosure Really
Mandatory? A Comparison of Real-Time Disclosure Frameworks and
Enforcement, 47 SEC. REGUL. L.J. 1, 11 (2019).
233. See id. at 8 (“Continuous disclosure regimes require listed companies
to disclose material information as a positive, proactive, and broad obligation.”
(citing Gill North, National Company Disclosure Regulatory Frameworks:
Superficially Similar but Substantively Different, 3 J. MARSHALL GLOB. MKT.
L.J. 187, 218 (2015))).
234. See, e.g., NASDAQ OMX Grp. v. UBS, Sec., LLC, 770 F.3d 1010, 1046
(2d Cir. 2014) (Straub, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is undisputed that the Exchange
Act does not provide for a private cause of action for violations of stock
exchange rules.”).
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even higher standard of proof attaches to such claims than to a
claim of fiduciary duty breach under Delaware law.235
Finally, despite the fact that many sources of law mandate
and regulate independence, they do not require much by way of
disclosure about what makes a director independent.236
Investors are thus in the dark over the nature of any potential
director biases as well as the process by which the board reached
its independence determinations.237
Yaron Nili has characterized this patchwork disclosure
system as “too much, too little, too late, and too soft.”238 It affords
boards “too much’” discretion over directors’ independence
status determinations;239 provides investors “too little”
information regarding the company’s independence standards
(and how directors satisfy them); 240 when a director’s
independence is challenged under state law, it is frequently too
late, “as these assessments are done post-hoc when it is too late
to address many of the issues that director independence is

235. See Shill, supra note 163, at 1265–66 (“A body of literature asserts
that the ascendance of the independent-dominated board has heightened the
agency costs problem, by making it easy for boards to nominate
management-friendly directors who meet stock exchange and Delaware
independence standards but do not act as a meaningful check on
management.”).
236. See Nili, supra note 116, at 63 (“[T]he current designation system of
directors as independent may suffer from structural concerns, and there are
numerous anecdotal examples demonstrating the deficiencies and lack of
proper disclosure by companies.”). The optimal level and form of disclosure is
a topic all its own. For an exploration of the costs and benefits of disclosure in
the context of initial public offerings, for example, see Jeremy McClane,
Boilerplate and the Impact of Disclosure in Securities Dealmaking, 72 VAND.
L. REV. 191 (2019).
237. David F. Larcker et al., 2015 Investor Survey: Deconstructing Proxy
Statements—What Matters to Investors, STAN. BUS. GRADUATE SCH. (Feb.
2015), https://perma.cc/9X9X-JNB7 (finding that 60 percent of institutional
investors view company independence disclosures as somewhat or not at all
effective).
238. Nili, supra note 116, at 53.
239. See id. (“It provides companies with too much discretion, as boards
retain too much power to assert the independence of their peer directors, and
they may suffer from behavioral bias in doing so.”).
240. See id. (“It provides investors with too little information regarding the
factual context against which a director is considered to be independent.”).
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meant to protect against” ex ante;241 and “too soft,” as
independence designations are rarely uncontested or vetted by
the stock exchanges or the SEC.242 These drawbacks, however,
are the product of larger problems upstream from the disclosure
regime, which suggests limited returns to tweaking that regime.
D.

Quantum and Structure of Director Compensation

In recent years, compensation of directors has risen and its
structure has changed from all cash to majority equity, with the
goal of incentivizing higher director performance. This
transition has altered the director role somewhat.
An independent directorship at a large company is a
prestigious role asking five hours of work per week for
$255,000 in median annual salary. This workload, which is
reported by directors themselves, amounts to a wage of
approximately $1,000 an hour . . . . As has been widely
documented, this combination has led to effective capture of
independent directors [by managers].243

The rise in director compensation complicates issues
around financial ties and actual (as opposed to mere legal)
independence.244
Compensation for a director on a single board may be
considered nominal because directors typically have a high net
worth.245 However, directors frequently serve on multiple
boards and may be loath to endanger their reputation as an
agreeable board member on any of them, which might place
seven figures of annual income at risk.246 Even the median
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Shill, supra note 163, at 1267.
244. See id. (explaining the salary of an independent director).
245. See Fairfax, supra note 83, at 155 (“[D]irector compensation is often
characterized as nominal, and hence it may not warrant serious
concern . . . . However, it cannot be considered nominal; indeed, the fact that
the average directorial compensation package exceeds the thresholds for
independence under federal rules reflects this.”).
246. See id. (“[T]he fact that directors have other sources of compensation
may reduce any concern that their board compensation may jeopardize their
impartiality.”).
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quantum a director receives for service on a single
large-company board is deemed material in an important,
relevant sense: it is more than double the amount that stock
exchanges allow outside directors to be paid in direct
compensation.247 In fact, for this reason, the exchanges
specifically exempt director compensation from determinations
of “material” connections to the firm.248 If the exchanges’ listing
standards did not do so, virtually no directors would be
considered independent under their own rules.249
More broadly, the trend towards paying more director
compensation in equity represents a questionable mirroring of
a trend in executive compensation known as “pay for
performance.”250 While that model is subject to many
critiques,251 there is no great logical leap required to justify
linking the pay of the head of a firm to the performance of the
firm. However, the rationale for extending it into the realm of
monitoring is less clear, and “the expansion of
payment-for-performance plans into the director arena is
puzzling.”252
Incentive pay for monitoring directors is something of an
oxymoron. Unlike executives, individual directors have little
247. See, e.g., Listed Company Manual, § 303A.02 Independence Tests,
supra note 147 (establishing a limit of $120,000 in direct compensation in any
twelve-month period during the prior three years, but exempting fees paid for
board service); Fairfax, supra note 83, at 154.
248. See Fairfax, supra note 83, at 155 (“This failure to account for director
compensation runs counter to the clear consensus regarding the
bias-producing nature of financial ties.”).
249. See id. (“Based on these rules, if directors’ board fees were not
excluded, the current amount of such fees would exclude the average director
from being considered independent under both [Sarbanes-Oxley] and
NASDAQ.”).
250. See Katherine M. Brown, Note, New Demands, Better Boards:
Rethinking Director Compensation in an Era of Heightened Corporate
Governance, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1102, 1122–29 (2007) (summarizing tradeoffs
involved in the trend towards increasing the equity component of
compensation).
251. See generally BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 196 (analyzing the power
corporate executives have to influence their own pay and the structural defects
that lead to this system).
252. See Brown, supra note 250, at 1132 (documenting difficulties in
measuring and incentivizing director performance).
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power to control or direct the corporation in any specific
direction.253 While management is tasked with driving the
company forward and improving value for shareholders,
directors are tasked with monitoring, which cannot be
adequately judged solely through equity or other performance
targets.254 Thus, equity compensation can be expected to be a
weaker motivator for directors than management.255
Where incentive pay for directors does motivate, there is
reason to ask whether its effects are wholly benign.256 Charles
Elson, an early advocate of equity compensation for directors,
wrote that it is designed to align director interests with those of
shareholders.257 However, it remains immaterial to most
directors when compared to their net worth. 258 As a result, even
when paid largely in equity, independent directors have little
skin in the game—but where a director accumulates
considerable equity in the firm (through stock grants conferred
over the course of a lengthy tenure, for example), her
253. See id. at 1126 (“Equity compensation may simply be an insufficient
motivator of director behavior.”).
254. See id. at 1132.
255. See Claudia Zeitz Poster & Mark R. Ullman, Director Pay: What
Makes Sense Today, DIRS. & BDS., 3d Quarter 2006, at 42, 46 (illustrating that
payment for performance induces directors to act like managers and, thus,
erodes the distinction between the two).
256. See Brown, supra note 250, at 1125–29 (arguing that director equity
compensation is undesirable on net).
257. See
Charles
Elson,
Director
Compensation
and
the
Management-Captured Board—The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50
SMU L. REV. 127, 135 (1996) (endorsing equity-based director compensation
as a mechanism for reuniting ownership and control and enhancing board
engagement); Michael Barrier, The Compensation Balance, INTERNAL
AUDITOR, June 2002, at 46 (cataloging opinions that equity ownership ties
director interests more closely to shareholders).
258. See Brown, supra note 250, at 1115
[F]inancial compensation may also influence the decision to serve
on a board, though only minimally for wealthy members. The
amount received as compensation for board service is generally very
small relative to the director’s other income and overall net worth.
Most directors are “successful professionals who have built
significant wealth,” and do not serve on boards for the monetary
rewards. (quoting Jay W. Lorsch, The Fuss Over Director’s Pay and
Pensions—Is Stock Ownership Really the Answer?, DIRECTORSHIP,
June 1996, at 3).
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impartiality may be dubious when she is presented with a
decision that may harm the value of her equity, at least in the
short run, such as by challenging a questionable ethical
practice.259 The prevailing market assumption appears to be
that a “Goldilocks” mix of cash and equity aligns director and
shareholder incentives without compromising director
independence, but there is little evidence it accomplishes any of
the above. Further, once ratified by shareholders, the quantum
and structure of director compensation are protected by the
business judgment rule and become essentially unreviewable.260
E.

Asymmetries in Information and Resources

Beyond the audit committee, no regulation requires that
independent directors have any particular skills or
knowledge.261 The market for directors is reasonably good at
ensuring directors have general business competence, but they
often lack industry or company specific knowledge that may be
necessary to determine the correct course of action.262 Thus,
even when information presented about the company is
accurate, complete, and free of manipulation, directors may
simply lack the knowledge and skill necessary to fulfill their

259. See Nili, supra note 183, at 121 (“[D]irectors might refrain from acting
diligently and independently when such actions would have a negative impact
on firm value and in turn on their equity, in the short to intermediate term,
even if such action would potentially improve long-term value.”).
260. See In re Invs. Bancorp, Inc. S’holder Litig., 177 A.3d 1208, 1211 (Del.
2017) (stating that shareholder ratification triggers business judgment review
“as long as the [director compensation] plan has ‘meaningful limits’ on the
awards directors can make to themselves”); infra Part IV.C.2.
261. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745
(regulating the disclosure of audit committee financial experts).
262. See Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, “Captured Boards”: The Rise of “Super
Directors” and the Case for a Board Suite, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 19, 29 (2017)
(“[W]hile many outside directors . . . may have general business skills, most of
them lack the relevant firm or industry-specific knowledge.”); see also Fairfax,
supra note 83, at 164–65 (“Thus, studies reveal that while many directors have
knowledge about general business matters, few have knowledge regarding the
particular industry on whose board they sit, and even fewer have knowledge
about the specific company on whose board they sit.”).
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duties.263 Other times, they may become better informed by
serving on multiple boards in the same industry, though this
raises both fiduciary and antitrust concerns264 and overlooks
alternative ways to recruit industry veterans.265
Independent directors are, by definition, outsiders to the
corporation. They work part-time, often sit on multiple boards,
are not supported by a staff of their own, and receive their
information from management.266 Proxy advisor voting
guidelines only deem directors “overboarded”—and thus counsel
revoking shareholder support in director elections—when they
sit on five or more boards,267 despite the obvious risk of
distraction from conscientious service on fewer boards. Modern
corporate governance theory deems such directors best suited to
monitor the corporation.268 However, with this outsider
perspective come the natural limitations on an outsider’s ability

263. See Fairfax, supra note 83, at 165 (“Corporate-governance scandals
tend to confirm that many directors lack the knowledge and expertise to
sufficiently appreciate the complexities associated with their business, and
that such lack of knowledge impedes the effectiveness of their oversight.”). In
principle, this problem could be addressed through outsourcing, though
directors would still need a way to select and supervise outsourcing firms. See
generally BAINBRIDGE & HENDERSON, supra note 66 (proposing outsourcing of
governance functions typically performed or overseen by the board).
264. See Yaron Nili, Horizontal Directors, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1179, 1242
(2020) (“If directors serve competitor companies, even under a broader
definition of competition, they may facilitate coordination between
competitors to the detriment of consumers.”).
265. See, e.g., Shill, supra note 163, at 1251 (describing the recruitment of
expert independent directors through the use of supplemental compensation
arrangements).
266. See id. at 1266 (“Even where no strong personal ties exist, structural
features of independent-run boards, including independent directors’ minimal
time investments and inferior access to information . . . .”); see also Kastiel &
Nili, supra note 262, at 28 (“Independent directors are part-time employees
who often sit on other boards or have other professional commitments, and
thus cannot devote more than a few hours per month to their role as
directors.”).
267. See INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., UNITED STATES PROXY VOTING
GUIDELINES
BENCHMARK
POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
12
(2018),
https://perma.cc/FBY9-XK8D (PDF) (setting forth proxy voting guidelines for
directors serving on multiple boards).
268. See Fairfax, supra note 83, at 130 (noting “overwhelming consensus”
favoring the “dominat[ion]” of boards by independent directors).
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to acquire information.269 Consequently, while they may bring
industry experience or skills to the table, independent directors
lack detailed intelligence on the firms they supervise, instead
relying on insiders to supply the information upon which they
will make decisions. 270 This indirect reliance on insiders by
definition weakens the potential of the independent board as a
monitoring body.271 Managers often have the capability and
incentive to filter and shape the presentation of information for
director consumption.272 Absent outside resources, captured
independent directors are susceptible to the same managerial
self-interest and bias that it is their raison d’ être to counteract.
***

269. See id. at 161 (“[T]he fact that independent directors are outsiders,
and hence not engaged in the daily affairs of the corporation, means that they
are dependent on the insiders that they must monitor to supply them with the
information necessary to discharge their responsibilities.”).
270. See id.; Shill, supra note 163, at 1266 (“[S]tructural features of
independent-run boards, including independent directors’ minimal time
investments and inferior access to information, complicate the project of
conducting meaningful oversight.”); Kastiel & Nili, supra note 262, at 27 (“In
particular, the move toward board independence generated severe
informational asymmetries between top executives and outside directors that
limit the ability of the board to closely monitor such executives and to properly
perform their role.”).
271. See Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP.
L. 447, 460 (2008) (“[T]hey rely on corporate officers and other employees for
information and tend to defer to insiders’ management recommendations.”).
272. See Fairfax, supra note 83, at 161 (“To the extent we are concerned
that insiders may inappropriately filter or otherwise manipulate the
information, independent directors may not alleviate this concern. This is
because such directors’ outsider status makes it difficult for them to verify the
accuracy of the information, and thus difficult to be effective monitors.”); Nili
& Kastiel, supra note 262, at 27
As a survey from 2007 demonstrates, only ten percent of directors
were able to access the corporation’s information independently,
through an online board portal. Therefore, the ability of an
independent board to effectively monitor management and
discharge their oversight responsibilities is based almost
exclusively on the information obtained, screened, and then shared
by management.
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Directors nominated by activist shareholders are less
vulnerable to some (though not all) of the above limitations.273
Such
directors—known
as
designated
or
activist
directors—usually qualify as independent from the companies
on whose boards they sit, but are less information-poor than
other outside directors because they can call upon the assistance
of staff at the fund that facilitated their appointment.274
However, as a percentage of public company directors,
designated directors are rare.275
IV. A Shield from Shareholders and Courts
This Part examines the domains where the independent
board is of the greatest utility to managers—namely, those
where it makes transactions eligible for business judgment rule
protection—few of which would be addressed by solutions
proposed to date.
“The trouble is,” as Stephen Bainbridge has written about
the supervisory work of independent directors, “one can tell two
radically different stories.”276 One version—the “faithful
monitor” story—holds that “independent directors assiduously
carry out their oversight obligations. In contrast,” a second
version, the “rubberstamp” story, “claims that they are little
more than management puppets.” 277 This second version is the
one Douglas was concerned about; he compared outside
directors to “business colonels of the honorary type—honorary
273. See generally Shill, supra note 163. For example, concerns around
structural bias may be lower for such directors since they are frequently added
to the board following an adversarial engagement and serve shorter director
terms, making it harder for ingroup loyalty to gel. See id. at 1274–86
(discussing loyalty issues). However, they introduce other concerns, such as
that of “dual loyalties.” Id.; see id. at 1296–99 (suggesting mechanisms to
manage loyalty issues).
274. See id. at 1268 (“[T]hey are less vulnerable to information capture,
because their nominating fund generally supplies them with briefing books
analyzing company information prior to board meetings.”).
275. See, e.g., Melissa Sawyer et al., Review and Analysis of 2018 U.S.
Shareholder Activism, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 5, 2019),
https://perma.cc/P6DL-SEKV (detailing the number of board seats obtained by
activists at U.S. issuers).
276. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1058.
277. Id.
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colonels who are ornamental in parade but fairly useless in
battle.”278 Both interpretations have explanatory value, and can
even apply to the same board with respect to different topics or
transactions.279
In 1993, Bainbridge argued that this conundrum yielded an
important question: “how closely should courts scrutinize
decisions made by independent directors?”280 If such directors
can be trusted to faithfully discharge their monitoring function,
then a higher bar for judicial intervention can safely be set,
since judges are hardly business experts and review would often
be redundant at best.281 If, however, they are not so reliable,
then the cost of broad deference may be higher.282 Bainbridge
observed that the American Law Institute’s Principles of
Corporate Governance was ambivalent on the question of what
impact the independent board should have on judicial review.283
Indeed, this critical question remains open.
This Article argues that the law makes it trivial for
captured boards to preclude judicial review, and that this has
immense consequences for the allocation of rights within the
corporation as between shareholders and managers. This
conclusion tracks the awkward position the independent board
occupies as both monitor in chief (ensuring that firm interest is
placed ahead of personal interest) and bulwark of efficiency
(against shareholder and judicial claims that the monitoring
function is not being fulfilled).
This Part contends that for crucial transactions, Delaware
law regarding the independent board counterintuitively locks in
resistance to monitoring that places key actions effectively
behind a shield. Part V, which follows, argues that changes in
278. WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 46 (1940).
279. Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1061 (“[T]he sticking point is that
both stories have an element of truth.”).
280. Id. at 1068.
281. See id. at 1047 (“[S]ome [scholars] argued that that judicial review is
at best redundant in light of the constraints on management already provided
by market forces, and at worse might impede corporate efficiency.”).
282. See id. (“[S]ome argued that independent directors do not provide an
effective check on management misconduct or, at least, that any constraints
they provide are similarly redundant in the face of the market forces.”).
283. See id. at 1068–81.
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market structure towards a stewardship role for mutual funds,
activist investors, and proxy advisors clad managers in
additional layers of armor, placing them beyond the reach of
market discipline in important ways.
A.

The Independent Board as Shield

The business judgment rule itself operates as a potent
shield by forcing critics of a company’s practices to take the Wall
Street Walk, i.e., sell the stock. Ronald Gilson wrote that it
“operates to bar courts from providing additional, and
unnecessary, constraints on management decisions through
judicial review of operating decisions.”284 But courts have
recognized that judicial review is not automatically
unnecessary, and thus not all decisions are automatically
eligible for business judgment treatment.285
Corporate policy decisions with the greatest salience to
management—the determination of CEO pay,286 the adoption of
takeover defenses that preserve incumbent managers’ jobs,287
the decision to effectively block a shareholder lawsuit 288 —and
the highest potential for conflicts of interest can be made secure
from judicial intervention only if they are approved by a
corporation’s independent directors. The logic undergirding this
adaptation of the business judgment rule is straightforward: the
284. Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 839 (1981)
(emphasis added).
285. See id.
286. See generally In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27
(Del. 2006) (considering whether a $130 million severance package paid to the
president upon his termination was a breach of fiduciary duty and waste).
287. See generally Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del.
1995) (assessing a challenge to defensive actions by a target corporation’s
board of directors in a takeover contest); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time
Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) (same); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (same).
288. Formation of a special litigation committee is a necessary
intermediate step to receiving business judgment rule deference in the
decision not to bring a derivative suit. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981) (stating that a special committee of independent,
disinterested directors can obtain dismissal of a derivative suit if they
determine that doing so is in the best interest of the corporation).
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approval of independents provides assurance against
self-dealing by managers, reducing the need for meaningful
judicial review.289 But while it imposes an additional
requirement on managers, it offers so much more in
exchange—namely, foreclosure of the most damaging claims.290
In this sense, the independent board structure now serves
the same function for decisions implicating the duty of loyalty
that the business judgment rule originally performed for the
duty of care, and yields the same outcome: deference to
managers, subject to procedural correctness.291 Both obvious
conflicts of interest and penumbral ones—that is, transactions
that implicate relationships that might not survive an
independence determination292 —are cleansable via a vote of the
independent directors.
In exchange for the extraordinary immunity conferred by
the independent board, corporations must make only modest
concessions in their governance: a bare majority of formally
independent directors (a restriction which in turn is defined
narrowly), some independent committees, the appointment of a
single financial expert to the audit committee, some additional
reporting.293 The fact that business judgment immunity in
high-risk transactions is conditioned on an approving vote of the
company’s independents leaves dissenting shareholders with
little opportunity to challenge such transactions other than to
attack the “independentness” of the decision-making body, but
289. Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 88 (“Although the business judgment
rule comes into play with respect to [duties of care, good faith, and loyalty], it
is most intimately associated with the duty of care.”).
290. See id. (“[I]f the business judgment rule does anything, it insulates
directors from liability for negligence.”).
291. See id. at 88–89 (“The rule . . . [provides] a presumption that the
directors or officers ‘of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith
and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company.’” (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984))).
292. This category is meant to extend beyond the types of relationships
that Sandys and Oracle held to constitute conflicts to embrace those that
require extensive litigation to clear, such as in Disney.
293. Technically, the corporation may decline to appoint even a single
director to the audit committee who is an “audit committee financial expert”
within the meaning of SEC rules, but must then explain why. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.407(a) (2020). In practice, companies choose to appoint such experts.
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plaintiffs bear the burden of showing lack of independence294
and, in the absence of colorful facts295 or extensive business
interconnections,296 such linkages between directors and
executives can be hard to show. Even where managers are not
obligated to accept all these impositions, such as in controlled
companies,297 they often opt into the extraordinary privilege
conferred by the independent model anyway.298
B.

Interaction with the Business Judgment Rule

The business judgment rule provides immunity for boards
of directors for their substantive decisions regarding corporate
policy so long as they have satisfied certain procedural
minima.299 It constitutes a “‘presumption that in making a
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company.’”300 When
294. See infra Part IV.B–C.
295. See, e.g., Sandys v. Pincus, 152 A.3d 124, 126 (Del. 2016) (holding that
co-ownership of a private airplane by a CEO and an independent director
created reasonable doubt as to whether the director was sufficiently
independent for demand purposes).
296. See id. at 134 (“When . . . pled facts suggest such a [mutually
beneficial ongoing business] relationship exists and the company’s own board
has determined that the directors whose ability to consider a demand
impartially is in question cannot be considered independent, a reasonable
doubt exists . . . .”); In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., No. 2017-0337-SG,
2018 WL 1381331, at *16–17 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 2018) (highlighting the
“multiple layers of business connections” that cast doubt on independence).
297. See Listed Company Manual, § 303A.00 Introduction, supra note 80;
Nasdaq Stock Mkt. Rules, supra note 17, § 5615(c). “Smaller reporting
companies,” which are generally issuers that have a public float of less than
$75 million, are also exempt from independence requirements. See Listed
Company Manual, § 303A.00 Introduction, supra note 80; Nasdaq Stock Mkt.
Rules, supra note 17, §§ 5605(d)(5), IM-5605-6.
298. Undoubtedly, one reason they do so is to head off criticism all public
companies face from shareholders and their advocates. See infra Part V.
299. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (“As for the
plaintiffs’ contention that the directors failed to exercise ‘substantive due care,’
we should note that such a concept is foreign to the business judgment
rule . . . . Due care in the decisionmaking context is process due care only.”).
300. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927 (Del. 2003)
(quoting Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995)).
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the rule is activated, decisions of the board become a black box
that courts will not investigate.301 This reflects a policy choice
that locates business decision authority on boards rather than
with courts, given the strengths of boards relative to courts in
that domain. Later court decisions, however, extend this choice
to domains where that logic does not obviously apply, including
in business decisions that raise questions about director and
manager loyalty and conflicts of interest. Given the power of the
rule to immunize board action, it is most consequential in these
reaches of the sprawling kingdom of board authority, where
approval by independent directors (acting as a group or on
committees) is absolutely required but also virtually
guaranteed.
Decisions by an independent board are “entitled to certain
beneficial presumptions,” 302 and the application of the business
judgment rule in contentious cases—those implicating the duty
of loyalty—rests on a foundation of board independence.303
Where conflicts are present, the approval of independent
directors is a precondition to cleansing: independence “inheres
in the [very] conception and rationale of the business judgment
rule. The presumption of propriety that flows from an exercise
of business judgment is based in part on this unyielding
precept.”304 Given the sweeping universe of transactions for
which independent director sanction is necessary to business
judgment immunity, it is fair to say the independent board

301. See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (“In
a purely business corporation . . . the authority of the directors in the conduct
of the business of the corporation must be regarded as absolute when they act
within the law, and the court is without authority to substitute its judgment
for that of the directors.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Helfman
v. Am. Light & Traction Co., 187 A. 540, 550 (N.J. Ch. 1936))).
302. Donald E. Pease, Outside Directors: Their Importance to the
Corporation and Protection from Liability, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 25, 35 (1987).
303. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984), overruled on
other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (stating that
independence presumes that a director will base his decisions on the
“corporate merits of the subject”).
304. Id.
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supercharges the rule, especially in the most sensitive cases. It
may even substitute for regulation.305
An examination of the rationale behind the business
judgment rule underscores both the theoretical and practical
significance of independence. Courts have said repeatedly that
they do not wish to involve themselves in business decisions, a
choice that, “at least in part, is grounded in the prudent
recognition that courts are ill equipped and infrequently called
on to evaluate what are and must be essentially business
judgments.”306 Thus, the rationale for judicial abstention is
strongest for what are “essentially business judgments,” such as
a choice between plowing profits back into the business and
returning them to shareholders via a dividend.307 These
implicate the duty of care. In another class of cases—those
implicating the interests of managers and directors, and thus
the duty of loyalty—the comparative competence of
businesspeople does not have any special bearing.308 The notion
that the board is the right place to cleanse duty of loyalty
problems on the board is a category error. As advocated in Part
VI, infra, courts are not only competent to adjudicate conflict
transactions but well positioned to do so.

305. See Fairfax, supra note 83, at 131 (“[T]he installation of independent
directors serves as a substitute for external regulation, particularly with
respect to ‘high risk’ transactions.”). Previous commentators have emphasized
the inadequacy of independence as a substitute for regulation to achieve public
ends. See, e.g., Velikonja, supra note 83, at 859–61 (positing that the embrace
of independent directors by institutional investors and managers, “in the
absence of evidence that it improves corporate performance or reduces
wrongdoing,” can be explained as a strategic choice favoring “marginal
decreases in corporate performance [in exchange] for the reduced risk of
costlier substantive regulation”).
306. Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979).
307. See generally Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
While the holding in this case intruded on this very choice, it is generally
taught as an example of a decision that would be difficult to justify on its stated
reasoning today following the ascent of the business judgment rule.
308. See, e.g., Bodell v. Gen. Gas & Elec. Corp., 140 A. 264, 267 (Del. 1927)
(“If in the particular case there is nothing to show that the directors did not
exercise their discretion for what they believed to be the best interest of the
corporation, certainly an honest mistake of business judgment should not be
reviewable by the Court.”)
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The independent board can only offer enhanced legal
immunity if the requirements of the business judgment rule are
first satisfied. To render themselves eligible for protection,
directors must discharge their duties of care and loyalty to the
corporation.309 Under Delaware law, their acts presumptively
satisfy this standard.310 To defeat this presumption,
shareholder-plaintiffs must show that directors breached their
fiduciary duties of loyalty or care.311 Precise formulations vary
among jurisdictions and courts within them; in general, courts
“will not interfere with [boards’] discretion unless it be first
made to appear that the directors have acted or are about to act
in bad faith and for a dishonest purpose,” 312 both of which are
difficult to prove. If the shareholder cannot meet this showing,
“the business judgment rule attaches to protect corporate
officers and directors and the decisions they make,
and . . . courts will not second-guess these business
judgments.”313 This standard sets a high bar to shareholder

309. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360–61 (Del.
1993); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (defining the duty of
loyalty as a ban on officers and directors using “their position of trust and
confidence to further their private interests”).
310. See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927
(Del. 2003) (“The business judgment rule is a ‘presumption that in making a
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company.’” (quoting Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d
1361, 1373 (Del. 1995))).
311. See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361 (Del. 1993) (discussing a duty of good
faith as part of directors’ fiduciary duties, which is now regarded as part of the
duty of loyalty), modified, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994).
312. Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 810 (Sup. Ct. 1976)
(quoting Liebman v. Auto Strop Co., 150 N.E. 505, 506 (N.Y. 1926)), aff’d, 387
N.Y.S.2d 993 (App. Div. 1976); accord Omnicare, Inc., 818 A.2d at 927
(observing that “[t]he business judgment rule, as a standard of judicial review,
is a common-law recognition of the statutory authority to manage a
corporation that is vested in the board of directors” (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del.
2003))).
313. Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361 (stating the law for Delaware). The
business judgment rule operates in similar fashion in other states.
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challenges of board decisions, elevated further by the doctrine
around the independent board.314
The business judgment rule operates like a judicial
abstention doctrine.315 If the shareholder fails to carry her
burden, the business judgment rule “operates to protect the
individual director-defendants from personal liability for
making the board decision at issue.” 316 The rationale is that
courts wish to avoid “apply[ing] 20/20 hindsight to second guess
a board’s decision, except ‘in rare cases [where] a transaction
may be so egregious on its face that the board approval cannot
meet the test of business judgment.’” 317 The business judgment
rule standard is closer to gross negligence than “substantive due
care” or “reasonableness.”318 Once the fiduciary duty boxes have
been checked, courts draw a curtain across the directors’
conduct that forecloses further judicial review.319
The roots of the business judgment rule lie in the logic of
comparative advantage. As Judge Frank Easterbrook has
explained, the rule “insulates most decisions from judicial
review because there is little likelihood that systematic judicial
intervention would make investors better off.”320 Judges, after
all, “are not selected for business acumen and are not penalized
314. See Arthur R. Pinto, Corporate Governance: Monitoring the Board of
Directors in American Corporations, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 317, 331–32
(1998) (discussing the rare success of plaintiffs in duty of care cases and the
reluctance of courts to interfere with business judgment decisions absent a
showing of negligence).
315. For a more thorough discussion of this issue, see generally
Bainbridge, supra note 1.
316. McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 917 (Del. 2000) (citing Cede & Co.,
634 A.2d at 361).
317. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 260 (Del. 2000) (alteration in original)
(quoting In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 362 (Del. Ch.
1998)).
318. See id. at 264 (expressly rejecting the “substantive due care”
formulation and noting that the court “do[es] not even decide if [business
decisions] are reasonable in this context”).
319. See id. at 266 (articulating a narrow standard for judicial review of
board decisions, stating that the alternative “would invite courts to become
super-directors, measuring matters of degree in business decisionmaking and
executive compensation”).
320. Frank H. Easterbrook, Comparative Advantage and Antitrust Law,
75 CALIF. L. REV. 983, 984 (1987).
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for bad decisions.” 321 Giving courts more power over the daily
workings of corporations would “increase the riskiness of
business decisions without making decisions better.”322 This
explains why the business judgment rule insulates corporate
decisions implicating the duty of care, but cannot explain why it
extends to decisions implicating the duty of loyalty.
The key difference between the application of the business
judgment rule in claims implicating the duty of care versus the
duty of loyalty is that the latter group requires the approval of
a body of independent directors, whether a committee or the full
board. In a duty of care case, unless the procedural presumption
of the business judgment rule is rebutted, a court will not
scrutinize the judgment of the board so long as the board’s
decision can be “attributed to any rational business purpose.”323
This has the effect of precluding duty of care claims except in
the most extreme circumstances. On top of these protections for
conduct implicating the duty of care, Section 102(b)(7)
exculpatory provisions,324 indemnification,325 and insurance also
shield directors from personal liability for violations of the duty
of care.326 Insurance provides a personal liability shield that can
outlive even the firm itself.
The combined effect of the independent board and the
business judgment rule is to make this same immunity
available to managers in transactions implicating the duty of
loyalty. Approving votes of independents can cure what might
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971); see
Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927 (Del. 2003) (noting
that the business judgment rule is “powerful because it operates deferentially”
and that a court will not “substitute its judgment” as long as the action in
question bears a relation to “any rational business purpose” (citing Unitrin,
Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995))).
324. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2020).
325. See E. Norman Veasey et al., Delaware Supports Directors with a
Three-Legged Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42
BUS. LAW. 399, 404 (1987) (discussing the role of indemnification, as
authorized by § 145 of the DGCL, in protecting directors).
326. See id. at 417 (stating that insurance covering directors fills the gap
where indemnification is unavailable, thereby providing fuller protection
against liability).
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otherwise be loyalty violations by CEOs. These apply to
takeover offers, CEO pay, derivative litigation, and other
conflict transactions discussed in the next subpart.
C.

A Shield for CEOs and Other Executives

The independent board has the power to confer business
judgment protection even on those transactions that present
severe conflicts of interest. To do so, it must secure approval of
independent directors, acting either as a majority of the board
or as the sole members of a committee, who are meant to stand
in for shareholder interests. Bainbridge has cited this division
of labor approvingly as an example of judicial recognition of the
superior position of boards in corporate law, above courts.327 The
experience, however, of independent directors—who are deeply
influenced by managers328 —suggests additional scrutiny of this
process is warranted. This subpart examines the relevance of
independent directors for board actions that present elevated
risks of manager opportunism at the expense of shareholders.
1.

Defensive Measures and Deal Protections

Public firms frequently acquire other firms or are
themselves the target of takeover bids in the market for
corporate control. The takeover market is meant to provide an
essential check on managers: as articulated in its classic form
by Henry Manne and later elaborated by Eugene Fama and
Michael Jensen, companies that do not perform well see a
decline in their market capitalization, which facilitates their
own takeover by other, stronger firms.329 For managers and
directors of firms that are the target of tender offers and other
takeover measures, however, the benefits to the shareholders of
creative destruction may not be front of mind. When a company
is acquired, the old business ceases to exist as an independent
327. See Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1068–81.
328. See supra Part III.
329. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control,
73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112 (1965); see also Eugene F. Fama & Michael C.
Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 313–14
(1983) (contending that “the takeover market provides an external court of last
resort for protection of residual claimants,” i.e., shareholders).
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entity.330 Its board and management are customarily reshuffled
through a mix of dismissals and demotions.331 Thus, while they
are obligated to act in the best interest of the corporation, both
managers and directors tend to worry about the loss of pay,
prestige, and power that often attends a merger into another
firm.332 On the other hand, when they receive an offer they find
attractive, they may want to protect that offer even as they take
soundings for higher bids.333 Boards and their advisors have
developed several mechanisms to take control of the deal
process that complicates the free market theory of corporate
control. The two most common categories of devices are
defensive measures and deal protections, and in both cases,
courts have held that the independent board precludes serious
judicial review.
The poison pill, the premier defensive measure, allows
boards to block tender offers outright.334 True to their name,
poison pills are intended to deter unsolicited bids by making
acquisitions of a large percentage of the firm’s equity
economically suicidal for the acquirer: once a threshold is
crossed, the pill is triggered and huge discounts are offered to
330. See Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1977) (“A
merger, however, involves the actual absorption of one corporation into
another, with the former losing its existence as a separate corporate entity.”).
331. See Nicholas J. Price, What Happens to a Company’s Existing Board
During a Merger?, DILIGENT INSIGHTS (Mar. 5, 2020), https://perma.cc/D354RQ8M (describing the process of board reconfiguration at the end of a merger).
332. See id. (“[M]ergers trigger uncertainty and ambiguity throughout the
organization. The uncertainties cause a drop in the trust level. It’s common for
all or most board directors, managers and other employees to go into
self-preservation mode.”).
333. See Albert O. “Chip” Saulsbury, IV, The Availability of Takeover
Defenses and Deal Protection Devices for Anglo-American Target Companies,
37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 115, 147 (2012) (“Target companies utilize deal protection
devices to reduce the risk of withdrawal of a favorable offer to purchase the
company. Directors may also use these provisions as leverage to negotiate a
higher purchase price, which results in a greater premium for the company’s
shareholders.”).
334. See, e.g., Chase deKay Wilson, Marty Lipton’s Poison Pill, 3 INT’L FIN.
L. REV. 10, 10 (1984) (discussing the role of Wachtell Lipton in formulating the
poison pill); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Toward a
Constitutional Review of the Poison Pill, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1568 (2014)
(discussing the status of the poison pill under state law as it interacts with
various sources of federal law).
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every other shareholder to buy stock in the firm.335 This
operates as discrimination against one bidder—the first to cross
the threshold—in favor of all other shareholders.336 Boards can
also adopt poison pills that “just say no” to any bid.337
Deal protections are meant to allow boards to encourage or
protect an offer from a particular bidder. These include no-shop
clauses, matching rights, and, very commonly, termination fees,
which “operate to deter competing bids by impeding subsequent
bidders from topping a favored bidder with a more attractive
offer.”338 As a matter of law, boards adopting them face less
scrutiny if their intention is to increase value for shareholders,
but when they contain personal benefits for the target board or
C-suite—such as continued board or executive service in the
merged entity—they spark a more searching review.339
While both defensive measures and deal protections face
the possibility of invalidation by Delaware courts, independent
boards can successfully deploy and defend them in practice. A
pair of Delaware Supreme Court cases from the mid-1980s
establish the fiduciary obligations of the target board in mergers

335. See Wilson, supra note 334, at 10–11.
336. See Matt Levine, Don’t Eat the Poison Pill by Mistake, BLOOMBERG
OP. (July 25, 2018, 11:02 AM) https://perma.cc/DV2K-WT2M
[T]he way poison pills work is . . . just sort of unbelievable.
Basically, if anyone triggers the pill—if they go over 10 or 20 or 31
percent of the stock or whatever the trigger is—then every other
shareholder of the company gets offered the right to buy a ton of the
company’s stock at a big discount. If people exercise these
rights—and they should because they offer the chance to buy stock
at a big discount—then many more shares are issued and the
triggering shareholder is massively diluted . . . . It just sort of
seems like this shouldn’t be allowed, that companies shouldn’t be
able to give massively discounted shares to all of their shareholders
except the one they don’t like.
337. See e.g., Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1355–57 (Del.
1985) (upholding a shareholder rights plan (a.k.a., “poison pill”) as a legitimate
exercise of business judgment by the target company’s board).
338. Anabtawi, supra note 50, at 171 & nn.34–36.
339. See id. (discussing the fact that transactions that contain inherent
conflicts of interest—such as a sale of control or the adoption of deal protection
devices—will be subjected to a higher scrutiny because the nature of those
transactions might tempt even the most independent or disinterested
director).
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and acquisitions.340 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc.341 obligates directors of a board selling the firm
to pursue the highest deal value available, which subjects any
defensive measures such as poison pills to enhanced scrutiny
review.342 The other case, Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,343
develops and applies the enhanced scrutiny standard in the
context of defensive measures.344 The two cases govern
Delaware courts’ review of deal protections as well. 345 Unocal
concludes that enhanced scrutiny applies unless directors
adopted measures that were both (1) “in good faith and upon a
reasonable investigation pursuant to a clear duty to protect the
corporate enterprise” and (2) “reasonable in relation to the
threat that the board rationally and reasonably believed was
posed” by an “inadequate and coercive” tender offer.346 If the
measure does satisfy those requirements, however, it will

340. See id. at 170 (observing that with regard to defensive measures and
deal protections, “deference to the board [via the business judgment rule] is
unwarranted. Without actual conflict, however, the entire fairness review
would be too stringent”).
341. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
342. See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42
(Del. 1994) (stating that enhanced scrutiny applies to “(1) the approval of a
transaction resulting in a sale of control, and (2) the adoption of defensive
measures in response to a threat to corporate control”); see also Anabtawi,
supra note 50, at 170 & n.31 (“In an M&A transaction negotiated by a
company’s board of directors, the specific contexts that give rise to enhanced
scrutiny are the sale of control of the company or entering into deal protection
devices.” (citing Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in the Last Period
of Play, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1901 (2003))).
343. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
344. See id. at 954–55 (recognizing that in the face of a possible takeover
bid, directors of a corporation are necessarily faced with a conflict of
interest—i.e., their fiduciary duty to shareholders on one hand and the
prospect of losing their jobs on the other—that requires judicial oversight).
345. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, A Buy-Side
Model of M&A Lockups: Theory and Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REV. 307, 319 (2000)
(“Uncomfortable with either extreme in the takeover context, the Delaware
Supreme Court set up new standards of ‘intermediate’ review in two landmark
cases in the mid-1980s—Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, and Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.—each of which bears on the legality
of lockups.”).
346. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958.
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receive business judgment deference.347 In Unocal itself, the
court provided a road map to that goal: a showing necessary to
satisfy the first prong (good faith and reasonableness) “is
materially enhanced, as here, by the approval of a board
comprised of a majority of outside independent directors.”348
That is to say, the court considers evidence of reasonableness
and good faith to be materially more credible when independent
directors approved of the challenged transaction.349
The erosion or “twilight” of enhanced scrutiny350 was thus
perhaps foreordained. Officially, the enhanced scrutiny
standard sits on a continuum between the business judgment
rule’s extreme deference at one end and the more exacting
standard of entire fairness review (requiring “judicial scrutiny
of the substance of business transactions for objective fairness
of both price and process”) at the other.351 After all, as Delaware
courts have acknowledged, “the realities of the decision-making
context can subtly undermine the decisions of even independent
and disinterested directors,”352 necessitating this intermediate
level of review. In practice, however, the independent board has
rendered enhanced scrutiny closer to the simple business
judgment standard.
347. See id. (stating that because the board’s action in undertaking a
selective stock exchange was made “in good faith and upon reasonable
investigation” and was “reasonable in relation to the threat that the board
rationally and reasonably believed was posed by [the bidder’s] inadequate and
coercive two-tier tender offer,” it was “entitled to be measured by the
standards of the business judgement rule”).
348. Id. at 955 (emphasis added).
349. See Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985)
(“Moreover, that proof is materially enhanced, as we noted in Unocal, where,
as here, a majority of the board favoring the proposal consisted of outside
independent directors who have acted in accordance with the foregoing
standards.”(citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955; Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
812 (Del. 1984))).
350. See Anabtawi, supra note 50, at 210 (concluding that the heightened
fiduciary duty standards for M&A transactions initially introduced by the
Delaware courts have given way to more judicial deference to board decisions).
351. See id. at 170 (“The enhanced scrutiny standard applies in contexts
that make it plausible to infer that a board is making a decision in the face of
dueling loyalties to both its own interests and those of the company’s
stockholders.”).
352. Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 457 (Del. Ch. 2011).
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Delaware courts conducting a Revlon review now apply a
“more deferential” standard to defensive measures.353 They ask:
“Did the board act in bad faith in pursuing a sale by willfully
disregarding its duty to obtain maximum value for the target
shareholders?”354 Framing it this way makes decisions hard to
review. Specifically, as Iman Anabtawi has explained, this
query collapses Revlon duties into the analysis of directors’
adherence to the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, which are
the preconditions for the application of the simple business
judgment rule.355 This makes judicial review of defensive
measures more akin to stock-for-stock deals. The independent
board exempts such deals from Revlon treatment, unless a
majority of the board is insufficiently disinterested and
independent.356
The Delaware courts have likewise effectively shut
enhanced scrutiny out of deal protection review, as the Unocal
court invited them to do.357 Paramount Communications, Inc. v.
Time Inc.,358 and Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp.359 are
leading examples—specifically with respect to Unocal’s first
prong, which requires that the board exercise good faith and
reasonable investigation before deciding that the challenged
measures are warranted.360 In Paramount, the court concluded
that the target’s decision not to negotiate with a bidder “cannot
353. See Anabtawi, supra note 50, at 172 (“The standards of review
articulated in both Revlon and Unocal have been diluted judicially over
time.”).
354. Id. (emphasis added).
355. See id. (“More recently, however, Revlon duties have been subsumed
into the traditional fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.” (quoting In re
Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc., S’holder Litig., 115 A.3d 1173, 1175 (Del.
2015))).
356. See In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 363 (Del. Ch.
2008) (defining this circumstance as “a majority of the board suffers from a
disabling interest or lack of independence” or the board is dominated by
directors who have a “material and disabling interest”).
357. See Anabtawi, supra note 50, at 172 (“The Delaware courts have also
eroded the Unocal standard of review, which the courts use to police
over-reaching deal protection measures.”).
358. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
359. 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
360. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
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be fairly found to have been uninformed” under the first
prong.361 It stated that “[t]he evidence supporting this finding is
materially enhanced by the fact that twelve of [the target’s]
sixteen board members were outside independent directors.”362
The court in Unitrin emphasized the same point: Unocal’s first
prong required the board to show that, “after a reasonable
investigation, it determined in good faith, that [bidder’s offer]
presented a threat to [the target] that warranted a defensive
response,” and “the presence of a majority of outside
independent directors will materially enhance such
evidence.”363 Both cases cite to the invitation in Unocal to use
independent directors to bolster the case for immunizing the
decision via business judgment review.364 As to the Unocal
standard of good faith and reasonable investigation, the
Delaware Supreme Court has determined that the approval of
independent directors, informed by financial and legal advice, is
sufficient to make out a prima facie case.365
Reflecting on these decisions, “many commentators now
believe that Unocal no longer provides the same level of
enhanced review [for deal protection measures] that it once
promised.”366 Some proposals urge a modest broadening of the
universe of transactions understood to trigger enhanced
scrutiny,367 but would continue the independent board’s central
361. Paramount Commc’ns, 571 A.2d at 1154.
362. Id. (emphasis added).
363. Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1375.
364. See id. (“This Court has held that the presence of a majority of outside
independent directors will materially enhance such evidence.”); Paramount
Commc’ns, 571 A.2d at 1154 (“The evidence supporting this finding is
materially enhanced by the fact that twelve of [the target’s] sixteen board
members were outside independent directors.”).
365. See Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 537 (Del. 1986) (“Here, the presence
of the 10 outside directors on the Texaco board, coupled with the advice
rendered by the investment banker and legal counsel, constitute a prima
facie showing of good faith and reasonable investigation.”).
366. Anabtawi, supra note 50, at 173. Observations in the same vein were
made closer to the time as well. See generally Pease, supra note 302.
367. See, e.g., Fernán Restrepo & Guhan Subramanian, The New Look of
Deal Protection, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1013, 1069 (2017) (advocating for the
application of the deal protection doctrine to provisions that have a deal
protection effect even if “they might have some colorable business purpose” as
well).
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role.368 Thus, a “principal impact of Unocal” remains the way it
“shifts the locus of power from the board at large, not to the
shareholders or to the court, but rather to the independent
directors.”369 Delaware courts, in an effort to provide greater
shareholder supervision of deal protection via the independent
board, placed too much weight on that structure.370
2.

Executive Compensation

Executive compensation is a high-priority topic for
managers. In recognition of the potential for managers to use
the mechanisms detailed in Part III to inflate their pay,
Delaware courts and the market have evolved special
procedures for boards to follow to increase the likelihood that
executive compensation plans will receive business judgment
protection, and thus immunity from judicial review.
The blueprint for the independent board to shield executive
compensation is inscribed in Delaware precedents upholding
the severance payment the Walt Disney Company made to its
ex-chief Michael Ovitz.371 In October 1995, Ovitz joined Disney
from a successful talent partnership, where he had an annual
income exceeding $20 million and an equity stake. 372 He
founded the partnership and owned a majority stake in it, and
would only agree to give that up for the Disney job if he received
“downside protection” in exchange.373 His Disney employment
agreement guaranteed him minimum compensation amounting

368. See id. at 1052 (explaining Unocal’s framework without questioning
its efficacy).
369. Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox: The Delaware Supreme
Court’s Takeover Jurisprudence, 19 J. CORP. L. 583, 587−88 (1994).
370. See id. at 590 (stating that the shareholders’ ability to elect and
remove the independent board provides a sufficient balance of power such that
courts do not have to engage in substantive review of board decisions).
371. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del.
Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
372. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 36−37 (Del.
2006).
373. Id. at 37.
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to around $24 million per year even in the event he was
terminated early.374
Though Ovitz’s arrival was greeted with great
enthusiasm—Disney’s stock price increased 4.4 percent on the
news, adding $1 billion to its market value375—within about a
year it became clear that “Ovitz was a poor fit with his fellow
executives.”376 By fall 1996, the board was discussing the
deterioration in the relationship between Ovitz and Disney, and
was moving towards a dismissal.377 Fourteen months after he
was hired, Ovitz was terminated.378 His employment agreement
contained a provision that relieved Disney of the obligation to
make a termination payment if he was fired “for cause,” but the
company was unable to find reason to activate that clause.379
Accordingly, when Ovitz was terminated, he received a full
“golden parachute” severance payment of $130 million.380 This
figure consisted of $38.5 million in cash (of which the board’s
compensation committee had prior knowledge) and about $91.5
million in options (as to which the knowledge picture was less
clear).381
The litigation centered on whether the hiring and firing of
Ovitz was reasonable, given among other things the size of the
severance payment.382 In examining this question, the court
found it critical that a board of independent directors had
approved Ovitz’s contract.383 Earlier challenges focused on
alleged deficiencies in the independence of each Disney director,
374. Id. at 37−38, 38 n.9. For tax and other reasons, the plan was later
revised somewhat. See id. at 38−41 (detailing the negotiations and
agreement).
375. Id. at 40.
376. Id. at 41−42 (internal quotation marks omitted).
377. Id. at 42.
378. Id. at 35.
379. Id. at 43−44.
380. Id. at 35.
381. Id. at 57.
382. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 277−78
(Del. Ch. 2003) (explaining that the complaint alleges that the directors did
not exercise due care in deciding to hire and fire Ovitz).
383. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 760 (Del.
Ch. 2005) (applying the business judgment rule), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
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but these were unsuccessful; 384 at one point, a court examined
whether the former CEO, Michael Eisner, might have a biasing
interest in the Ovitz contract, but concluded he did not. 385 These
were important findings, since, as the Chancery court
explained, Eisner had “stacked” the board “with friends and
other acquaintances who, though not necessarily beholden to
him in a legal sense, were certainly more willing to accede to his
wishes and support him unconditionally than truly independent
directors.”386 Nevertheless, because Ovitz’s employment
agreement—including the severance package—had been
approved by a board of independent directors who met the
narrow formal legal definitions of independence and
disinterestedness, and was concluded upon the advice of a
compensation consultant, the Supreme Court held that the
business judgment rule attached to the decisions to hire and fire
him, and thus to the payment of $130 million.387 Specifically,
these decisions constituted “protected business judgments, made
without any violations of [the independent directors’] fiduciary
duty,” and as such they were shielded from shareholder
challenge.388
The size of the severance in Disney is unusual, but that
decision’s reliance on the independent board to immunize
executive compensation transactions is now canonical and
common. Rather than exploring more deeply limitations of the
independent board detailed in Part III, supra, Delaware courts

384. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 361 (Del.
Ch. 1998) (“[T]en of the fifteen directors who approved the Agreement and
eleven of the sixteen who voted to honor the Agreement were independent in
deciding the issues.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Brehm v. Eisner,
746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
385. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 258 (Del. 2000) (affirming the
lower court’s ruling as to Eisner’s alleged bias). To be precise, the court held
the plaintiffs failed to create reasonable doubt about whether he had such an
interest. Id.
386. In re Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d at 760.
387. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 73 (Del.
2006).
388. Id. (emphasis added). The court also rejected plaintiffs’ waste claim.
Id. at 75.
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police the boundaries of the rule.389 For example, the Chancery
court in Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo!390 observed of executive
compensation plans that “a board cannot mindlessly swallow
information” from third parties (such as compensation
consultants), and must instead “exercise its own business
judgment in approving an executive compensation
transaction.”391 Another Chancery decision, Friedman v.
Dolan,392 explained that courts reviewing executive
compensation decisions “typically defer[] to the business
judgment of independent directors making compensation
decisions.”393 Absent a breach of fiduciary duty, courts have
“declined to scrutinize mere acceptance of compensation
determined by an independent board or committee.”394
In sum, the determination of executive pay is presumed
proper and entitled to business judgment deference when it is
made by formally independent outsiders whom the executives
are widely acknowledged to influence. Courts ostensibly address
the problems inherent in that process by interrogating directors’
independent status, which tends to confirm the central role of
independence in shielding manager decisions.
3.

Derivative Litigation and Special Litigation Committees

When a shareholder believes the corporation has a legal
claim against a director or officer, she can bring a derivative suit
with the goal of triggering a lawsuit by the corporation against
that party (or, more realistically, a settlement). Claims over
Ovitz’s contract in Disney fit this definition, as does the bulk of
shareholder litigation.

389. See id. at 172 (stating that Delaware courts use the Unocal standard
to “police over-reaching deal protection measures”).
390. 132 A.3d 752 (Del. Ch. 2016), abrogated on other grounds by Tiger v.
Boast Apparel, Inc., 214 A.3d 933 (Del. 2019).
391. Id. at 783
392. No. CV 9425, 2015 WL 4040806 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015).
393. Id. at *9 (emphasis added).
394. Id. (footnote call omitted).
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Since the claim belongs to the corporation and not the
plaintiff, the board is entitled to weigh in on it. 395 The procedure
to inform the board is known as a litigation demand, made by
the plaintiff upon the board.396 To evaluate the merits of the
demand, the board must be independent as to the demand,397
i.e., the directors must lack a personal interest in the
litigation.398 The directors are presumed independent at this
stage, and the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that
reasonable doubt exists as to the independence of a majority of
the directors.399 If the plaintiff carries that burden, then the
demand requirement is excused. 400 The board at that stage will
commonly constitute a committee of independent directors,
typically called a special litigation committee, to consider the
suit.401 Their member-directors must be independent (under
Delaware law) to perform this cleansing function, and bear the
burden of showing it.402 The determination of whether a demand
395. See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1048 (Del. 2004) (stating that a
plaintiff must make a demand of the directors that they pursue litigation
before she can pursue a derivative suit unless that demand is excused under
the Aronson standard).
396. See id.
397. See id. (stating that demand is excused if the directors are “deemed
incapable of making an impartial decision regarding the pursuit of the
litigation”).
398. See id. at 1049 (“A director will be considered unable to act objectively
with respect to a presuit demand if he or she is interested in the outcome of
the litigation or is otherwise not independent.”).
399. See id. at 1048−49 (“[T]he directors are entitled to a presumption that
they were faithful to their fiduciary duties. In the context of a presuit demand,
the burden is upon the plaintiff in a derivative action to overcome that
presumption.”).
400. See id. at 1049 (“If the Court determines that the pleaded facts create
a reasonable doubt that a majority of the board could have acted
independently in responding to the demand, the presumption is rebutted for
pleading purposes and demand will be excused as futile.”).
401. See, e.g., In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 923 (Del.
Ch. 2003) (describing the board’s formation of a special litigation committee);
Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 781 (Del. 1981) (introducing the special
litigation committee procedure). An entire literature exists on the use and
procedural mechanics of special committees, which will not be plumbed here.
402. See In re Oracle Corp., 824 A.2d at 937 (“I begin with an important
reminder: the SLC bears the burden of proving its independence. It must
convince me.”).
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must be made turns on the independent status of the members
of the board.403
As in the examples of mergers and executive compensation,
corporate law’s reliance on captured independent directors
empowers managers to shield their own conduct in the
highest-salience cases because independence triggers the
application of business judgment immunity. As the Delaware
Supreme Court said in the 1984 case Aronson v. Lewis,404 “[t]he
requirement of director independence [in considering litigation
demands] inher[e]s in the conception and rationale of the
business judgment rule. The presumption of propriety that
flows from an exercise of business judgment is based in part on
this unyielding precept.”405
The independence-business judgment nexus is critical. The
court explained: independence signifies “that a director’s
decision is based on the corporate merits of the subject before
the board rather than extraneous considerations or influences,”
and must reflect each director bringing her “own informed
business judgment to bear with specificity upon the corporate
merits of the issues without regard for or succumbing to
influences which convert an otherwise valid business decision
into a faithless act.”406 At the same time, it gave a sense of how
difficult it would be for plaintiffs to show that a director had
fallen short on independence.407 For example, the court stated
that it was not enough to show that a director had been installed
directly or indirectly by a controlling shareholder, for the simple
reason that (at that time) “[t]hat is the usual way a person

403. See Beam, 845 A.2d at 1048 (stating that demand is excused if the
directors are “deemed incapable of making an impartial decision regarding the
pursuit of the litigation”).
404. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
405. Id. at 816.
406. Id.
407. See id. (“The shorthand shibboleth of ‘dominated and controlled
directors’ is insufficient.”).
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becomes a corporate director.”408 It has scarcely become easier
to challenge the independent status of a director.409
This process is now well established. By 1993, “courts both
in and out of Delaware ha[d] ruled with near unanimity . . . that
the business judgment rule is the appropriate standard of
judicial review” where a majority of independents on the board
decide to quash a derivative suit.410 In practice, this means a
captured board can shield managers with impunity. While one
empirical study found that special litigation committees often
recommend pursuit or settlement rather than dismissal of
derivative suits,411 another found that no special litigation
committee “ha[d] ever recommended that derivative litigation
continue against sitting directors . . . .”412 Even the former
finding is consistent with the independent board functioning as
a shield: it provides managers with a way to resolve disputes
against them expeditiously and with less fanfare, and the merits
of the decisions to do so—once insulated by the independence
board—receive business judgment immunity.
4.

Management Buyouts

Acquisitions by managers of Delaware corporations they
run trigger an elaborate review procedure.413 In common with
the corporate governance mechanisms described above, the
availability of business judgment protection for a management
408. Id.
409. See supra Parts II–III. One arguable exception is where a controlling
shareholder is present, but for reasons discussed in Part II.B.1, it is unclear
whether new precedents in that area can be extended to non-controller cases.
410. Dennis J. Block et al., Derivative Litigation: Current Law Versus the
American Law Institute, 48 BUS. LAW. 1443, 1443−44 (1993). The conclusion
boards formally reach is that a lawsuit on behalf of the corporation will not
serve the corporation’s best interests.
411. See Minor Myers, The Decisions of the Corporate Special Litigation
Committees: An Empirical Investigation, 84 IND. L.J. 1309, 1320 (2009) (“Over
forty percent of the time the SLC [special litigation committee] either settled
or pursued one or more claims against one or more defendants.”).
412. ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING
CORPORATE LAW 524 (4th ed. 2013).
413. See Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014)
(stating that the entire fairness standard, which is “the highest standard of
review in corporate law[,]” usually applies to such mergers).
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buyout (MBO) is conditioned on the use of independent
directors.414 Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp.,415 known as MFW,
sets forth the conditions under which a board’s MBO process
“qualif[ies] to be given cleansing credit under the business
judgment rule.”416 This process consists of two requirements:
approval by (1) an independent special committee of the board
convened for the purpose of evaluating the transaction, and (2)
a majority of the minority (non-controlling) shareholders.417 The
Delaware Supreme Court has described “the central objective”
of MFW as being “to provide an incentive for controllers to
embrace the procedural approach most favorable to minority
investors, with the incentive of obtaining the protection of the
business judgment rule standard of review.”418 Independent
directors are a necessary precondition419 for an MBO
414. See id. (stating that the controller must “irrevocably and publicly
disables itself from using its control to dictate the outcome of the negotiations”
for the transaction to be eligible for business judgment protection).
415. 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).
416. In re MFW Shareholders Litigation, 67 A.3d 496, 501 (Del. Ch. 2013).
In addition, while discussion of DGCL § 144 is reserved for Part IV.C.5, there
is some possibility that that provision provides an additional mechanism of
insulation for management buyouts. See, e.g., Tuch, supra note 30, at 951−58,
981−82 (discussing the protection provided by § 144 in self-dealing
transactions); Iman Anabtawi, Predatory Management Buyouts, 49 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1285, 1308 (2016) (explaining that the business judgment rule does not
apply in conflict-of-interest transactions); Guhan Subramanian, Deal Process
Design in Management Buyouts, 130 HARV. L. REV. 590, 650 (2016) (describing
standards of review for MBOs under MFW and § 144); Matthew D. Cain &
Steven M. Davidoff (now Davidoff Solomon), Form Over Substance? The Value
of Corporate Process and Management Buy-Outs, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849,
874–76 (2011).
417. See M&F Worldwide, 88 A.3d at 644 (setting forth the standard of
review).
418. Flood v. Synutra Int’l, Inc., 195 A.3d 754, 756 (Del. 2018).
419. The full set of conditions was ably summarized in another Chancery
case. See Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Volgenau, No. CV 6354, 2013 WL 4009193,
at *10 (Del. Ch. Aug. 5, 2013)
The [MFW] Court held that the business judgment rule could apply
if all of the following conditions were satisfied: (1) the controlling
stockholder at the outset conditions the transaction on the approval
of both a special committee and a non-waivable vote of a majority
of the minority investors; (2) the special committee was
independent, (3) fully empowered to negotiate the transaction, or to
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transaction to “qualify to be given cleansing credit under the
business judgment rule.”420 The underlying theory is that
independence and other aspects of the process “had the effect of
replicating an arms’ length transaction,” and thus “they had a
‘cleansing’ effect on the transaction that justified judicial review
under the deferential business judgment rule.”421 Specifically,
with regard to independent directors, the MFW Chancery court
explained:
[A] structure [that requires the approval of the independent
directors is one] where stockholders get the benefits of
independent, empowered negotiating agents to bargain for
the best price and say no if the agents believe the deal is not
advisable for any proper reason, plus the critical ability to
determine for themselves whether to accept any deal that
their negotiating agents recommend to them.422

In the MBO context, the assumption that independent
directors will act in an informed manner, independent of
managers, is even weaker than it is in a generic public company
context.423 As Da Lin has documented empirically, director seats
are a form of “controlling shareholder patronage,” which
includes the prospect of future rewards as well as current

say no definitively, and to select its own advisors, and (4) satisfied
its requisite duty of care; and (5) the stockholders were fully
informed and uncoerced.
420. See In re MFW Shareholders Litig., 67 A.3d at 501
[I]t has to be clear that the procedural protections employed qualify
to be given cleansing credit under the business judgment rule. For
example, if the MFW special committee was not comprised of
directors who qualify as independent under our law, the defendants
would not be entitled to summary judgment under their own
argument.
421. See Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 2013 WL 4009193, at *10 (discussing the
standards set forth by the court in In re M & F Worldwide); see also Velikonja,
supra note 83, at 882 (“Similarly, Delaware courts defer to outside directors’
judgment in ‘freeze-outs,’ where a controlling shareholder of a public company
buys out minority shareholders, so long as the process they adopted appears
appropriate.”).
422. In re MFW Shareholders Litig., 67 A.3d at 503 (emphasis added).
423. See supra Part III.A.2.
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rewards, that can “systemic[ally]” influence the behavior of
formally independent directors.424
5.

Related-Party Transactions Under DGCL § 144

Section 144 of the DGCL furnishes an analogous example
of the board serving as a shield, via disinterested rather than
independent directors.425 This provision establishes the criteria
by which transactions between the corporation and certain
classes of persons, including managers and directors, can be
rendered non-voidable notwithstanding the fact that they
constitute so-called interested or related-party transactions.426
Purchases by the corporation of real estate, a company, or
another asset owned by a director are examples of such
transactions.427 A disinterested director is one who lacks an
interest in the transaction.428 While Section 144 applies to
disinterested rather than independent directors, like the above
categories it deploys the judgment of directors who are
ostensibly neutral as a substitute for external oversight.
Section 144 identifies three ways for a contract with a
covered party to remain valid, despite the conflict of interest:
approval via a board process (the full board or a special
committee approves it by a majority vote of disinterested
directors); approval via a shareholder process (the shareholders
approve it); and validation through a judicial process (the

424. Da Lin, supra note 100, at 518.
425. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 144 (2020).
426. A fairly extensive literature exists on § 144 of the DGCL. Some
commentators favor a broader read that attaches greater significance to a
§ 144 approval, contending that it “protects a self-dealing transaction not only
from invalidation but also from distinct, additional fairness review.” See Tuch,
supra note 30, at 953 (distinguishing and explaining broad and narrow
interpretations of § 144).
427. See id. at 941 (“[A]ny transaction between directors or officers and
their corporation constitutes self-dealing . . . .”).
428. See Blake Rohrbacher et al., Finding Safe Harbor: Clarifying the
Limited Application of Section 144, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 727 (2008) (“A
director will generally be found to be ‘interested’⎯and thus not a ‘disinterested
director’ under section 144(a)(1)⎯if he or she stands on both sides of the
transaction or has a personal stake in the transaction that is not shared by
stockholders generally.”).
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transaction is later determined to be fair to the corporation).429
None of these is sufficient on its own to activate the business
judgment rule; however, any one of them will provide a safe
harbor from a common law rule by which the transaction in
question would have been rendered automatically void.430
Specifically, the statute sets “a minimum requirement to retain
the protection of the business judgment rule.”431 If the managers
or directors wish to render the transaction eligible for business
judgment shielding, the terms of Section 144(a)(1) allow them to
secure the approval of an appropriate subset of disinterested
directors.432
***
Management of the corporation is delegated to the board of
directors by statute.433 The reason for this is straightforward:
courts are not institutionally equipped to make garden-variety
business decisions, and would lack legitimacy if they attempted
to do so. Substituting their judgment for that of business
entities on everyday business matters also runs afoul of market
principles. By its terms, however, this standard account is
limited to the wisdom of business decisions. It properly applies
to questions implicating the duty of care, but Delaware courts
rightly do not extend them automatically to decisions
implicating the duty of loyalty.
Yet despite the lack of any comparative advantage, the
board’s power to shield is not limited to “care” judgments and
extends to board decisions that require independent directors to
weigh their abstract loyalty to the firm against the concrete
material advantages that come with supporting its managers.

429. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 144(a) (2020).
430. See Tuch, supra note 30, at 952−53 (explaining the operation of § 144).
431. HMG/Courtland Props., Inc. v. Gray, 749 A.2d 94, 113 (Del. Ch. 1999).
The provision does not conclusively determine whether business judgment or
entire fairness applies, but as the court explains in HMG/Courtland, it does
establish necessary conditions for the application of the more deferential
business judgment rule. See Rohrbacher, supra note 428, at 735−36
(discussing the court’s decision in HMG/Courtland).
432. HMG/Courtland, 749 A.2d at 114.
433. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 141(a) (2020) (“The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the
direction of a board of directors . . . .”).
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Directors lack any obvious skill at determining if their CEO is
acting in a self-interested way, for example—and there is reason
to believe they may overlook such flaws, consciously or
unconsciously.434 In 1993, Stephen Bainbridge argued that
boards are nevertheless given the ability to cleanse conflicts of
interest because they exercise final authority.435 Given the
growing universe of decisions for which the independent board
can be deployed as a shield, the normative case for maintaining
this rule today is a harder one.
V.

A Shield from Market Discipline

Shifts in market structure this century have supercharged
managers’ ability to deploy the combination of the independent
board and the business judgment rule as a shield not only
against judicial review but against market discipline.
Passive investment436 and shareholder activism437 have
surged in terms of assets under management and broader
market influence. Increasingly, outsiders to the corporation like
mutual funds, institutional investors, activist shareholders, and
proxy advisors invest resources in monitoring corporate

434. See supra Part III.
435. See Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1074−75 (“So long as the decisions
are made by disinterested and independent directors, the net effect of the rules
governing derivative litigation and the substantive standards is to preclude
judicial review of the transaction.”). Bainbridge favors a highly deferential
standard generally. See id. at 1074 (arguing that shareholders benefit more
from a “centralized management structure” than from close judicial scrutiny,
and that “[t]he power to review . . . is necessarily the power to decide”).
436. See, e.g., Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder
Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493, 494 (2018) (“In the past few years, millions of
investors have abandoned actively managed mutual funds . . . in favor of
passively managed funds[.]”); Bebchuk et al., supra note 62, at 94 (“Passively
managed funds increased from 1 percent of total fund assets in 1984 to 12.6
percent in 2006 . . . .”); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs
of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance
Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 884−85 (2013) (discussing increased
investment through mutual funds).
437. See Shill, supra note 162, at 1254 (“Shareholder activism is surging.
By the end of 2015, activist hedge funds had come to manage $120 billion in
investor capital, double the figure from three years prior, and ten times the
total from 2005.”).
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governance matters.438 These sophisticated actors participate in
a new “market for corporate influence,” and they “use the
influence that accompanies their large ownership positions to
discipline management.”439 They help curb “managerial slack,
primarily because they identify underperforming firms as part
of their investing strategy and are motivated to discipline
wayward
management.”440
But
they
have
some
well-documented limitations.441
For example, mutual funds have a limited ability to monitor
and discipline portfolio companies.442 The “Big Three” fund
families, which have recently bulked up their governance ranks,
have about one to two employees charged with monitoring every
1,000 of their portfolio companies.443 It is difficult to imagine
these ratios increasing to the point where funds can exercise
effective discipline over all of their portfolio management teams.
Activist hedge funds, which have an entirely different business
model, nevertheless do not furnish much by way of
counterexample: they deploy a large number of staffers per
portfolio company, but invest in few companies.444 Pershing
Square, for example, has an investment team of eight who,
together with other staff, monitor twelve companies. 445 Activist
funds can be quite aggressive, so it is likely that their efforts

438. Activist hedge funds and mutual funds are both species of
institutional investor, but operate differently. See Lund, supra note 436, at
498 n.16 (explaining different types of institutional investors).
439. Id. at 494–95.
440. Id. at 495.
441. See, e.g., id. at 493 (arguing that passive funds lack appropriate
incentives to ensure companies are well run and face collective action
problems); see also Bebchuk et al., supra note 62, at 100 (same); Gilson &
Gordon, supra note 176, at 863 (noting agency costs in institutional
investment reflecting a gap in the interests of beneficial owners and the
institutional investors who manage their assets).
442. See infra note 443 and accompanying text.
443. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 62, at 100 (“Vanguard employs about
15 staff for voting and stewardship at its 13,000 portfolio companies;
BlackRock employs 24 staff for voting and stewardship at 14,000 portfolio
companies; and State Street Global Advisors employs fewer than 10 staff for
voting and stewardship at 9,000 portfolio companies.”).
444. See infra note 445 and accompanying text.
445. Lund, supra note 436, at 516 n.112.
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generate some in terrorem effect on companies outside their
portfolio. Even this dynamic, though, focuses boards on highly
visible weaknesses in their governance. In the market’s view,
insufficient independentness is a prominent example of such a
weakness.
In all, the population of companies whose stock trades on
the major U.S. stock exchanges numbers in the thousands.446
The corporate governance of many flies under the radar of the
limited teams monitoring them. Even proxy advisory firms like
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis,
whose business is to advise investors on companies’ corporate
governance, operate in an environment of scarce resources447
and intensifying regulatory pressure, including new regulations
of the industry from the SEC.448
Managers are well positioned to capture rents from these
inefficiencies. With Big Three funds assigning small teams to
monitor 9,000 to 14,000 portfolio companies,449 the growing
focus on corporate governance has created an information
assimilation challenge. It expanded the market for information
about governance without a way to effectively manage it. After
all, firms are constantly advised that “[o]utside directors can
bring expertise and independence to the board, which can

446. Shares of approximately 6,500 companies are traded on the New York
Stock Exchange and Nasdaq combined; stock of a further 339 companies are
traded on NYSE American (formerly the American Stock Exchange). See
Company List (NASDAQ, NYSE, & AMEX), NASDAQ, https://perma.cc/XJ9D8S6E.
447. Their impact is often overstated. See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch &
Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J.
869, 869–71 (2010) (estimating on the basis of empirical evidence that
industry leader Institutional Shareholder Services shifts 6–10 percent of
shareholder ballots, and characterizing the firm’s primary influence as that of
an information aggregator).
448. See David Bell et al., SEC Tightens Regulations on Proxy Advisory
Firms, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 18, 2020),
https://perma.cc/TLZ9-PBN5; Exemptions from the Proxy Rules for Proxy
Voting Advice, Exchange Act Release No. 34-89372, 85 Fed. Reg. 55,082 (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240); Supplement to Commission Guidance Regarding
Proxy Voting Responsibilities of Investment Advisers, Investment Company
Act Release No. 5547 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 276).
449. See supra note 443 and accompanying text.
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reduce agency costs and improve firm performance.”450 But how
do firms prioritize? How do they avoid the crosshairs of an
activist or proxy advisor,451 which could in turn stimulate
interest at a mutual fund that could tip a director election?
While complicated in principle, in practice staying in the
good graces of corporate governance opinion leaders (proxy
advisors and others) is straightforward. A version of this
phenomenon began decades ago with federal requirements that
mutual funds engage in informed voting, which in turn created
demand for proxy advice and thus firms specializing in it. 452 ISS,
Glass Lewis, and other proxy advisors prepare research and
report cards on companies’ governance structures to advise
funds and other investors on voting their shares, and to advise
companies on their own and one another’s exposure.453 Given an
extraordinary volume of information and a need to facilitate
comparisons, these materials tend to stress features of
governance that can be readily standardized across public
companies, and about which information is publicly disclosed
and easy to ascertain.
Corporate governance by check box has attracted
considerable criticism, but in a universe of scarce monitoring
resources it is natural for market interest to coalesce around
standardized, comparable metrics. ISS’ voting guidelines are
organized into seven categories.454 The range of topics they
touch is vast, but the level of board independence rates highly.455
ISS recommends avoiding overboarding (director membership
450. DAVID F. LARCKER & BRIAN TAYAN, INDEPENDENT AND OUTSIDE
DIRECTORS 15 (2015), https://perma.cc/K2QV-8KTP (PDF).
451. Arguably, the new SEC rule pertaining to proxy advisors makes it
easier to avoid pressure from them. See Bell et al., supra note 448.
452. See Lund, supra note 436, at 517 (discussing how voting guidelines
are influenced by proxy advisors like ISS and Glass Lewis).
453. See generally ISS Governance, INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS.,
https://perma.cc/UTL3-WYQB; Glass Lewis: Company Overview, GLASS LEWIS,
https://perma.cc/3HQC-GSNL.
454. See INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., UNITED STATES PROXY VOTING
GUIDELINES BENCHMARK POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 2–6 (2019) https://
perma.cc/7JZT-LUQ9 (PDF) (listing categories); see also id. at 5–6 (listing an
eighth category for mutual fund proxies).
455. See id. at 8 (listing independence as the first fundamental principle
to apply when voting on the board of directors).
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on an excessive number of boards), separating the roles of board
chair and CEO, facilitating shareholder access to the proxy, and
other highly visible, highly salient features of governance that
are nevertheless relatively low cost to implement.456 Pension
funds
similarly
adopt
guidelines
that
emphasize
independence.457 Investment banks, law firms, accounting
firms, and other market intermediaries echo this message.
Since independentness currently codes as a quality favoring
shareholders, enhancing the officially independent character of
a board (under flawed definitions) is a cheap signal by managers
that they are prioritizing that goal. Boards can obtain favorable
voting recommendations from ISS and Glass Lewis—and thus
avoid the spotlight—by following their guidance, thus virtually
guaranteeing the reelection of their directors. In the
overwhelming majority of cases, directors are reelected.458
The above dynamics have created a market for corporate
governance information and influence that prizes independence.
Just as in other markets, market actors can minimize scrutiny
by complying with expectations. What is somewhat unusual in
the case of corporate governance, however, is the focus on the
level of board independence. This focus both reflects and
intensifies the parallel emphasis on independent directors in
Delaware law. Filtered through the limitations of the
independent board459 and the power of the business judgment
rule,460 it enables managers to place important aspects of their
conduct—including decisions that create the potential for
self-dealing—beyond the reach of market discipline.
456. See id. at 7–11, 19–20 (giving guidelines on the composition and
independence of boards and shareholder proxy access).
457. For example, the voting guidelines of CalPERS, the California public
employees’ pension fund and one of the largest such funds, as of 2016 imposed
an elevated disclosure expectation of companies with regard to independence.
They asked companies to explain why any directors serving in excess of twelve
years should still be considered independent. CA. PUB. EMPS. RET. SYS., GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 20 (Mar. 4, 2016), https://perma.cc/5C36-CN8E
(PDF).
458. See, e.g., James B. Stewart, Bad Directors and Why They Aren’t
Thrown Out, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2013), https://perma.cc/T7XV-H8CU (noting
that over 99 percent of directors were reelected in 2012).
459. See supra Part III.
460. See supra Part IV.
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VI. Courts, Not Boards, Should Adjudicate Conflicts
Too much of modern corporate governance depends on the
presumed virtues of outside independent directors. Such
directors are increasingly called upon to clear transactions that
create actual or penumbral conflicts of interest for them—and
changes in market structure461 since the rise of the independent
model make this error more consequential than before.
Managers exert tremendous influence over independent
directors’ status on the board, their pay, whether they are
considered for future board and executive opportunities, and
their ability to learn information about the firm and the
managers they are charged with supervising.462 Delaware
courts are hardly unaware of this issue;463 indeed, they have
identified each of these as a problem.464 In Unocal, for example,
the court warned of the “omnipresent specter that a board may
be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the
corporation and its shareholders.”465 Yet in negotiating this
tension, Delaware courts have settled on processes466 that all
hang on the same thin reed: the judgment of an independent
board that has often been captured by managers and converted
to a shield.467
In view of the combined danger posed by the independent
board and the business judgment rule, this Part urges an end to
business judgment deference in transactions implicating the
duty of loyalty and a return to robust judicial review via the
entire fairness standard. In the alternative, it proposes an
expansion of shareholder voting.

461. See supra Part V.
462. See supra Part III.
463. See, e.g., supra Parts III–IV.
464. See supra Parts III–IV; In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d
917, 938–43 (Del. Ch. 2003) (commenting on various types of biasing ties).
465. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
466. See, e.g., In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 509 (Del. Ch. 2013)
(articulating a standard that “the director in question’s material ties to the
person whose proposal or actions she is evaluating [must not be] sufficiently
substantial that she cannot objectively fulfill her fiduciary duties”).
467. See, e.g., supra Parts II–V.
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The best way to address the shield problem is by subjecting
transactions with high self-dealing potential to review for entire
fairness.468 This standard calls for “judicial scrutiny of the
substance of business transactions for objective fairness of both
price and process.”469 It is the standard of review that Delaware
courts apply when a transaction fails to receive business
judgment deference.470 If the possibility of business judgment
review is removed, entire fairness becomes the logical,
appropriate vehicle for assessing transactions that are currently
shielded. When litigated, the decision by a company like Disney,
for example, to enter into an agreement to pay $130 million in
severance to a former CEO who was only briefly associated with
the firm would be reviewed to determine whether it was entirely
fair to the corporation and its shareholders.
Pressures on independent directors that Delaware courts
(and stock exchanges) have spent decades dancing around471
should, under Delaware law at a minimum, be considered
conflicts of interest that render board decisions on conflict
transactions ineligible for business judgment immunity. Unlike
in ordinary business matters,472 boards have no comparative
advantage in deciding such questions. Courts—neutral
decisionmakers who, especially in Delaware, are regularly
called upon to adjudicate matters of equity—are a more
desirable institution in which to vest such authority. Judge
Easterbrook has emphasized this distinction. While we “praise”
measures that align managers’ incentives with those of
shareholders, he observed, the notion of incentivizing judges
with money is anathema to judging: “If a judge should bet on the
468. Today, once approved by the independent board, review of such
transactions is essentially limited to waste. See In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 73–74 (Del. 2006) (noting that appellants’ waste
claim is “rooted in the doctrine that a plaintiff who fails to rebut the business
judgment rule presumptions is not entitled to any remedy unless the
transaction constitutes waste”).
469. Anabtawi, supra note 50, at 170.
470. See id. at 169–70 (discussing when the business judgment rule is
applied compared to the entire fairness standard).
471. See supra Parts II–IV.
472. See Fairfax, supra note 83, at 140–41 (discussing greater legitimacy,
expertise, and proactive capacity of boards to manage corporations, relative to
courts).
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astuteness of his business judgments by holding stock in the
firms that appeared before him, we would hustle the judge off to
jail.”473 Unlike generic business decisions that do not pose
conflicts, decisions that present the prospect of self-dealing
should be reviewable by judges and not only by those who stand
to gain from the self-dealing. As Judge Easterbrook says,
“[s]elf-interest is a powerful spur.”474
It will be objected that companies are simply compelled by
the market to guarantee large sums of money to prospective
CEOs if they are to lure top talent (indeed, the Disney court
seemed to think this was plausible).475 Even if true today, this
position excludes the possibility of dynamic reactions to change.
If such packages were to come under more intense judicial and
shareholder scrutiny, they would be required to meet elevated
standards of fairness to the corporation. Boards would likely
respond with fairer terms and greater transparency, both of
which would be desirable. The risk that this new equilibrium
would fail to produce an adequate quantity of qualified CEOs
seems low.
Restoring entire fairness review would also place the
determination of a legal question—whether a transaction
constitutes self-dealing—into the appropriate hands: those of
judges. Judges are uniquely well positioned to adjudicate
conflicts of interest as a matter of competence and institutional
role. Not only do they have deep experience in the area, they
have taken an oath to pursue justice and fairness without
partiality.
Even if imperfectly realized, the ideal of the judge and the
institution of the judiciary is one of fairness. The four canons of
the Delaware Judges’ Code of Judicial Conduct command
judicial neutrality by mandating “integrity,” “independence,”
“impartiality,” and the absence of judicial conflicts of interest.476

473. Easterbrook, supra note 320, at 984.
474. See id. (explaining his support for pay-for-performance in executive
compensation).
475. See supra Part IV.C.2.
476. DEL. JUD. ETHICS ADVISORY COMM., DELAWARE JUDGES’ CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT 9–20 (2008), https://perma.cc/QUA3-QE2S (PDF).
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The canons of the federal counterpart are similar.477 Corporate
directors and managers, by contrast, are not valorized for
fairness but for other qualities. They pursue shareholder wealth
maximization. More specifically, self-dealing in the gray zones
detailed in this Article does not run afoul of the legal constraints
they currently operate under because any infirmities can be
eliminated by independent directors.478 And even when
operating diligently and in good faith, they face structural,
behavioral, and financial headwinds and incentives that
compromise their ability to fairly adjudicate conflicts. 479
It will also be objected that entire fairness will ensure more
litigation. This is likely correct. In recent years, many reforms
have been proposed to reduce shareholder litigation, and some
have been adopted. There may be room for a
welfare-maximizing change that simultaneously dials up the
scrutiny of decisions currently shielded while dialing down
other channels. In re Trulia, which limits the availability of
disclosure-only settlements that do not make shareholders
whole, may provide a model. 480 Inevitably, however, some
certainty would be lost if the proposed shift is adopted. But the
powerful shield furnished by current law allocates the benefit of
that certainty almost wholly to managers, at great cost to
shareholders and other stakeholders. This is hard to square
with the principles underlying either the fiduciary duty of
loyalty or shareholder wealth maximization (to say nothing of
other theories of corporate purpose).
Recommended fixes to date that propose targeting the
independence channel alone would be helpful but are
insufficient. Yaron Nili, for example, suggests more robust
disclosure of independents’ potential conflicts of interest.481
Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani suggest the creation of
“enhanced-independence” directors who would play a key role in

477. See generally Code of Conduct for United States Judges, U.S. CTS.,
https://perma.cc/ZG6J-UKKT (Mar. 12, 2019).
478. See supra Part IV.
479. See supra Part III.
480. See In re Trulia, Inc. S’holder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 897–99 (Del. Ch.
2016).
481. Nili, supra note 116, at 70–72.
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cleansing conflict transactions in controlled companies.482 These
solutions build broadly on enhancements to the independent
board proposed a generation earlier by Ronald Gilson and
Reinier Kraakman.483 However, their common limitation is the
expectation that independent directors can productively serve
as a cleansing device for a wide range of conflict transactions.
When independent directors decide on transactions of great
personal interest to managers, such as CEO pay, they are
inherently conflicted. This is not the kind of problem for which
an internal solution, like disclosure, is a practical remedy. Other
scholars, such as Lisa Fairfax, have counseled more structural
solutions, for example a revival of governance by inside
directors, though she has acknowledged the case is an “uneasy”
one and has also called for more “rigorous review” by courts.484
A next-best solution would be to condition business
judgment deference on shareholder ratification. Boards could
have the option to submit decisions concerning CEO pay, poison
pills blocking tender offers that shareholders would support,
derivative lawsuits, and other matters implicating independent
directors’ interests to shareholders for express approval at an
annual or special shareholder meeting. Delaware law already
requires boards to submit many bet-the-company corporate
decisions485 and quasi-constitutional changes486 to shareholder

482. Bebchuk
&
Hamdani,
supra
note
170,
at
1290
(“Enhanced-independence directors should play an active role when a conflict
arises between the interests of the controller and those of public investors.”).
483. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 170, at 883 (recommending “the
introduction of outside directors to actively monitor public corporations in the
shareholders’ interest.”).
484. See Fairfax, supra note 83, at 186.
485. The most prominent example concerns decisions that could
conceivably transform or destroy the corporation before the next meeting. See,
e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251(c) (2020) (merger requires approval of target’s
shareholders); id. § 271 (sale of substantially all the corporation’s assets
requires shareholder approval); id. § 275 (dissolution requires shareholder
approval).
486. These include amendments to the corporation’s articles of
incorporation (DGCL § 242(b)(1)), changes to the bylaws (DGCL § 109(a)), the
exculpation of directors or officers (DGCL § 102(b)(7)), authorizations of
additional shares (DGCL § 242(a)(3)), and the election and removal of directors
(DGCL § 141(k)), among other changes.
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votes, and stock exchange rules487 and federal law488 further
require shareholder approvals for executive compensation and
other matters of special shareholder salience. This would be a
modest extension, amply precedented. 489 Some of these votes
would replicate ones, such as on executive compensation,490 that
are already mandatory under stock exchange or federal rules.
However, if business judgment immunity were conditioned on
favorable outcomes one would expect these votes to better reflect
shareholder wishes. At the moment, federally mandated
shareholder votes on executive pay are advisory and lack any
legal effect.491
As a practical matter, this solution would likely trigger
litigation over whether the stockholder vote was fully informed.
The Delaware Supreme Court held in Corwin v. KKR Financial
Holdings492 that a fully informed vote of disinterested,
uncoerced public shareholders forecloses claims of fiduciary
duty
breach—essentially,
that
it
operates
as
a

487. See Listed Company Manual, § 303A.08 Shareholder Approval of
Equity Compensation Plans, N.Y. STOCK EXCH., https://perma.cc/585T-9NC4
(requiring shareholder approval of equity compensation plans).
488. See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 1.422–3 (2020) (requiring shareholder approval
of equity compensation plans).
489. For example, courts already consider board decisions regarding
independent director compensation to implicate self-interest, and thus
condition business judgment treatment on an informed, approving vote of
shareholders. See In re Invs. Bancorp, Inc. S’holder Litig., 177 A.3d 1208, 1211
(Del. 2017) (holding that upon submission by the board of “specific [i.e.,
non-discretionary] compensation decisions for approval by fully informed,
uncoerced, and disinterested stockholders, ratification [by shareholders] is
properly asserted as a defense in support of a motion to dismiss” and thus
business judgment immunity available). The MBO and related-party
transaction contexts provide further precedent. See Kahn v. M&F Worldwide
Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 642–54 (Del. 2014) (detailing MBO procedure); DEL CODE
tit. 8 § 144(a)(2) (2020) (addressing submissions of related-party transactions
to shareholders); supra Part IV.C.
490. See, e.g., supra notes 487–488 and accompanying text.
491. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–21 (setting forth procedures for shareholder
consideration of executive compensation).
492. 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015). For an argument that Corwin does not
amount to a reversal of shareholder protections, see generally Matteo Gatti,
Did Delaware Really Kill Corporate Law? Shareholder Protection in a
Post-Corwin World, 16 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 345 (2020).
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shareholder-approved shield.493 Since that time, litigation has
shifted away from the question of breach to the question of
whether the shareholder vote was adequately informed.494 If
adopted, this change would likely provoke a similar shift, which
should lower the expected value of this already modest change.
The shareholder ratification model, increasingly popular in
Delaware,495 also equates the approval of shareholders with
permission to engage in transactions that verge on self-dealing.
However, since it is an appropriation of their own assets that
the conduct they are voting on potentially authorizes, this is not
as objectionable as it may seem. An analogy would be allowing
crime victims to negate the prosecution of those accused of
victimizing them, a practice that prosecutors de facto permit in
some cases even as it substitutes a private interest for the public
interest. But there is some evidence to suggest the value of
shareholder approval is significantly overstated and thus
Delaware’s “obsession with the shareholder vote” misplaced.496
To be clear, this alternative suggestion is much less desirable
than the primary reform advocated by this Article, but it is also
more consonant with prevailing trends in Delaware law.
The better reform would be to make the broader category of
self-dealing transactions this Article introduces497 subject to
judicial review for entire fairness. However, either change
proposed here would address a longstanding mistake: the
expectation that an “independent” board that is indebted to
managers and has the power both to make corporate policy
493. See Corwin, 125 A.3d at 311–14 (holding that all facts regarding the
board’s interests, KKR’s interests, and the negotiation process, were fully
disclosed).
494. See Edward B. Micheletti et al., Corwin, MFW and Beyond:
Developing Trends in Delaware Disclosure Law, SKADDEN INSIGHTS (Nov. 19,
2019), https://perma.cc/FTL2-F4X7 (discussing how courts in recent cases
focus on whether shareholder votes were fully informed).
495. See James D. Cox et al., Understanding the (Ir)relevance of
Shareholder Votes on M&A Deals, 69 DUKE L.J. 503, 528 (2019) (discussing
how various factors caused Delaware courts to “put shareholder ratification
on a pedestal”).
496. See id. at 504 (contending that trades by merger arbitrageurs on the
eve of a deal have “a positive and statistically significant impact on the
likelihood of merger deals garnering the required shareholder approval”).
497. See supra Part IV.
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decisions that enrich managers and to shield them from review
would reliably resist that temptation.
VII. Conclusion
While proponents and skeptics of shareholder power
disagree on the effectiveness of the central institution of modern
corporate governance—the independent board—both groups
assume that it protects shareholders from opportunistic and
predatory
managers.498
The
legal
requirements
of
“independence,” however, set forth a standard that is very
forgiving of potential conflicts of interest, and many reasons
exist to believe directors are frequently incapable of overcoming
those conflicts. Thus, once an independent board is seated and
other procedural minima are satisfied, managers can use the
board to shield self-interested transactions through the
business judgment rule.499 In short, the independent board’s
vision has been captured by the very cohort—managers—it was
designed to constrain.500 This paradox applies not only in the
realm of law, but in the capital markets, where changes in
market structure enable the independent board to frustrate
both traditional and emerging mechanisms of market
discipline.501
Previous proposals that advocate tweaks to the
independence standard are unlikely to alter this dynamic.502
Fortunately, Delaware law already provides good alternatives
for managing conflict transactions.503 The best choice is to
simply submit such decisions to judges for review under the
well-established entire fairness standard. Doing so would end
the dubious use of the independent board as a vehicle for
shielding corporate conduct from shareholders, courts, and
markets. It would also constitute a step towards addressing the
larger problem of which misplaced faith in the independent
498.
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.

See supra Parts I–II.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Parts III–IV.
See supra Part V.
See supra Parts III–VI.
See supra Part VI.
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board is a symptom: the pervasive use in corporate and
securities law of self-regulation as a substitute for traditional
safeguards, like judicial review.

